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Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.1 This inquiry is
important and timely because third-party copyright cases have
become high stakes affairs that potentially affect the viability
of entire industries. Copyright holders worry that digital tech-
nology, particularly the Internet, will destroy the value of copy-
rights by facilitating rampant copyright infringement. Anyone
with a personal computer can make perfect copies of copy-
righted works and post them on the Internet, making it possi-
ble for millions of people 2 to download free copies of music and
movies.3 Copyright holders believe that these free downloads
1. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. Official statistics for Internet usage do not exist. The number of Inter-
net users worldwide now exceeds one billion. Internet World Stats, Internet
Usage Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited
Oct. 19, 2006). According to the Computer Industry Almanac, worldwide Inter-
net users are projected to number nearly 1.8 billion by the end of the decade.
Press Release, Computer Indus. Almanac Inc., USA Leads Broadband Sub-
scriber Top 15 Ranking (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.c-i-a.com/pr1105.htm.
3. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI)
claims that the number of infringing music files available on the Internet fell
slightly from 900 million in January 2004 to 870 million in January 2005.
INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MusIc REPORT 23 (2005),
http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/digital-music-report-2005.pdf; see also
INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MusIc REPORT 16-21
(2006), http://www.ifpi.orgflibrary/digital-music-report-2006.pdf (describing
file-sharing activity and industry efforts to curb it). Estimates of the impact of
infringing downloads on music sales vary. See Stan J. Liebowitz, Will MP3
Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence So Far, 15 AD-
VANCES STUDY ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECON. GROWTH 229, 240-
51 (2004) (finding that alternative theories do not explain an obvious drop in
record sales); Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy
on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT IS-
SUES 71, 75 (2004), available at http://www.serci.org/docs 1_2/waelbroeck.pdf
(finding a twenty percent decrease in music sales due to file sharing); Rafael
Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Dis-
placement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49 J.L. &
ECON. 29, 53 (2006) (finding 0.2 lost album sales for each illegally downloaded
album); Alejandro Zentner, File Sharing and International Sales of Copy-
righted Music: An Empirical Analysis with a Panel of Countries, TOPICS ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL'Y, 2005, at 1, 5-6 (documenting a 6%-12% decrease in music
sales due to file sharing, correcting for broadband penetration, per capita
GDP, and other factors); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect
of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis 4 (June 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with The Minnesota Law Review), available at
http://economics.missouri.edu/Seminars/PDF/strumpf.pdf (showing no effect
on music sales). In regard to movie downloading, one source estimates that, in
2005 alone, film studios lost $447 million as a result of illegal downloading in
the United States. See Sarah McBride & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Studios See Big
Rise in Estimates of Losses to Movie Piracy, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2006, at B1.
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represent lost sales, and they understandably worry that their
businesses will fail unless the downloads are stopped. 4
The normal remedy for copyright infringement is litigation
against infringers. However, the number of computer-based in-
fringers is so large that copyright holders cannot find and sue
them all.5 Copyright holders have therefore sued many provid-
ers of Internet-related technologies and services in an attempt
to hold these providers liable for infringement committed by
others. These actions include claims against Internet service
providers, creators of file-sharing technology, search engine
companies, venture capitalists, and credit card companies. 6 The
plaintiffs in these cases have typically argued that the defen-
dant should be held liable for someone else's infringement be-
cause the defendant supported that infringement.7
4. Several artists have voiced this concern, including Steve Smith, singer
for Dirty Vegas ("It's having an effect on us as a new band. If you stop buying
the CDs in the shops, then we don't get to make the music."), DMX ("[Piracy
is] killing the industry as we know it. Stop stealing. Go in the store and buy
like everybody else."), and Luciano Pavarotti ("Artists and composers-
particularly the younger ones-will not stand a chance of creating music in the
future if their recordings are simply stolen in this way."). MusicUnited.org,
What the Artists and Songwriters Have to Say, http://www.musicunited.org/
3_artists.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
5. See supra note 3 (discussing the wide availability of infringing music
files available on the Internet).
6. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (third-
party copyright liability action brought against an Internet service provider);
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (third-party
copyright liability action brought against a peer-to-peer network creator);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (third-
party copyright liability claim against the creator of a file-sharing network);
Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (action against
a search engine company for, among other things, third-party copyright liabil-
ity); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(claims of primary and third-party copyright liability against a search engine
operator); Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 181, 183-84 (D.D.C. 2005)
(third-party copyright liability claim against the Yahoo! and Google search en-
gines); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, No. C 04-0371, 2004 WL
1773349, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004) (third-party copyright liability suit
against credit card companies that processed payments for businesses alleg-
edly committing infringement); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222
F.R.D. 408, 409 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (third-party copyright liability action against
venture capitalists who funded a peer-to-peer technology provider); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365-66
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (third-party copyright liability suit against an Internet ser-
vice provider); Complaint at 16, 34, 43, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., No.
CV05-4753, 2005 WL 1935670 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2005) (third-party copyright
liability claims brought against a search technology provider).
7. Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1074-75 (alleging that the defendant Internet ser-
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These lawsuits have proven controversial. On one hand,
copyright holders have legitimate interests in preventing in-
fringement and receiving compensation for infringement. On
the other hand, third-party defendants understandably wonder
why they should pay for another person's misbehavior. Indeed,
defendants rightfully worry that liability could drive them out
of business because the costs of Internet-related infringement
could be enormous. It is not even clear where society's best in-
terests lie. Third-party copyright liability benefits society by
encouraging individuals to stop others from infringing, but
those benefits come at a price because third-party defendants
cannot focus precautions solely on infringers.8 Accordingly,
third-party copyright liability suppresses noninfringing as well
as infringing behavior. Society's best interests therefore require
some kind of balance between the desirable and undesirable
consequences of third-party copyright liability, but it is not ob-
vious how that balance should be struck.
To make matters worse, fundamental contradictions exist
in the relevant case law. Before Grokster, courts took two dis-
tinct approaches to third-party copyright liability. Some ap-
plied such liability in a relatively limited way, while others ap-
plied it more expansively. This division rendered the law
incoherent, and it polarized debate about third-party copyright
liability because both sides could credibly claim that existing
precedent supported their positions. 9
vice provider should be liable for providing subscribers with access to the
USENET newsgroup, where infringing copies of the plaintiff's works were on
display); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 645 (contending that the
creation of the defendant's file-sharing network establishes third-party copy-
right liability); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851-53 (arguing
that the defendant Google should be held liable because it supports infringe-
ment by others); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799
(N.D. Cal. 2005) ("[P]laintiffs allege that by investing in Napster and assum-
ing control of the operation of the Napster file-sharing network, the named de-
fendants contributorily and vicariously infringed plaintiffs' exclusive rights
under the Copyright Act."); Visa, 2004 WL 1773349, at *2 (claiming that fi-
nancial services provided by the defendants to the infringers renders the de-
fendants liable for infringement); Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1365
(alleging that the defendant Internet service provider should be held liable be-
cause the infringer gained Internet access through defendant's system); Com-
plaint, supra note 6, at 34, 43 (alleging defendant's support for copyright in-
fringement via search technology).
8. See infra pp. 213-14 (discussing the undesirable consequences of hold-
ing Internet service providers liable for their customers' infringing activities).
9. See Craig A. Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability
and Contributory Infringement: From Interstitial Gap Filler to Arbiter of the
Content Wars, 58 SMU L. REV. 357, 378-95 (2005) (describing the expansive
2006]
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Grokster gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to clarify
third-party copyright liability law. The Grokster defendants
distributed software that established peer-to-peer networks on
the Internet.10 These networks allowed users to make any type
of file available for others to download.1 1 The associated soft-
ware also allowed users to submit search queries to locate de-
sired files.1 2 In theory, the networks created by the defendants
could have been used solely to exchange files that would not in-
fringe copyright. However, the vast majority of files exchanged
over the networks turned out to be infringing copies of copy-
righted songs and movies. 13 The Grokster plaintiffs owned the
copyrights in many of the works most commonly shared over
the defendants' networks.1 4 They sued, arguing that the defen-
dants were liable for the infringement committed by the net-
works' users.' 5 The district court decided the case in the defen-
dants' favor at summary judgment on the ground that the
noninfringing uses of the defendants' network were sufficient to
excuse the defendants from liability. 16 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.1 7
Predictably, both parties and numerous amici urged the
Court to choose existing interpretations of law that favored
their particular interests. The Court acknowledged the parties'
differing interpretations of the law, but it did not resolve the
case by choosing between them.' 8 Instead, the Justices unani-
mously adopted a dormant theory of third-party copyright li-
ability-inducement-and used it to reverse the decision be-
low.' 9 According to the Court, noninfringing uses could not
excuse a defendant from third-party copyright liability if the
application of third-party copyright liability in the contributory infringement
context); infra Part I (describing conflicting interpretations of third-party
copyright liability).
10. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2770 (2005).
11. Id. at 2770-71.
12. Id.
13. Id. ("[A]lthough the [defendants'] networks . . . can be used to share
any type of digital file, they have prominently employed those networks in
sharing copyrighted music and video files without authorization.").
14. Id. at 2771.
15. Id.
16. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1035-36 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
17. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
18. Id. at 2778-80.
19. Id. at 2779-83.
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defendant deliberately induced others to infringe. 20 The Court
identified enough evidence of such inducement by the defen-
dants to make summary judgment inappropriate, 21 and re-
manded the case for further consideration. 22
Grokster is not a simple case. It initially appears to compli-
cate matters by endorsing inducement without explicitly resolv-
ing the conflicts in existing law. However, careful analysis of
the conflicting theories that animate copyright liability shows
that Grokster created an improved framework for future con-
struction of third-party copyright liability.23
20. Id. at 2779 ("[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of
intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose
rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law." (citing Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984))).
21. Id. at 2780-83.
22. Id. at 2783. All nine Justices joined the opinion of the Court. Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer each wrote concurrences joined by two other Justices.
Justice Ginsburg took the position that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony and
that the evidence of noninfringing uses of the defendants' networks was insuf-
ficient to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Grokster, 125
S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Breyer disagreed, stating
that, but for evidence of deliberate inducement, the defendants should not
have been held liable because their networks were sufficiently capable of non-
infringing uses. Id. at 2787-89 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 2788
("[T]he evidence now before us shows that Grokster passes Sony's test-that
is, whether the company's product is capable of substantial or commercially
significant noninfringing uses.").
23. Not every commentator concludes that Grokster improved the law of
third-party copyright liability. Professor Tim Wu argues that Grokster was
wrong to introduce intent to copyright law, and that the social welfare costs
and benefits of a defendant's behavior should be the only determination con-
trolling third-party copyright liability. Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005
SUP. CT. REV. 229, 249-51. Professor Wu makes a provocative point, one that
is consistent with the usual refrain that copyright functions solely as an incen-
tive for the production of creative works. E.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (stating
that the copyright monopoly exists to advance the public interest by motivat-
ing the creative activity of authors); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)
(emphasizing that the economic philosophy behind copyright law is to advance
the public interest by encouraging individual effort). However, consistency
with the primary justification for copyright is not, in and of itself, a sufficient
reason to make considerations like a defendant's intent irrelevant to the ques-
tion of third-party copyright liability. This is because such liability is not a
"core" component of copyright. Third-party copyright liability entered copy-
right because courts analogized copyright to tort law. See infra note 24 and
accompanying text (supporting the proposition that third-party copyright li-
ability arose from common law tort). It therefore makes just as much sense to
prefer the basic principles of tort over those of copyright when constructing
third-party copyright liability. As of now, matters of intent occupy a prominent
place in torts, and there is no sense that courts are about to abandon the doc-
trines of intentional torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
2006]
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Courts consistently state that the doctrines of third-party
copyright liability arose from common law tort.24 It therefore
comes as no surprise that the most important theories of tort,
fault and strict liability, shed considerable light on the con-
struction of third-party copyright liability. 25 For example, third-
party copyright liability could be a matter of fault. If so, liabil-
ity exists because a defendant's behavior is culpable or socially
PHYSICAL HARM § 5 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (imposing liability for
intentional causation of physical harm); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 13 (1965) (imposing liability for intentional causation of harmful or offensive
physical contact). Granted, one could argue that tort law itself should abandon
questions of intent in favor of a strict social cost-benefit analysis. However,
that position remains controversial. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 191 (1980) (arguing that wealth maximization
alone cannot serve as an adequate governing principle for law); George P.
Fletcher, Remembering Gary-and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L. REV. 279, 282-89
(2002) (reviewing debates between economic and corrective justice theories of
tort and criticizing the economic approach to tort theory); Mark Geistfeld, Rec-
onciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety Matters More
than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 146-47 (2001) (arguing that an altered
cost-benefit analysis can compensate even the least compensable risks); David
McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107 ETHICS 205, 212-15 (1997)
(arguing that wealth maximization can only be reconciled with individuals'
rights to be free of risks imposed by others where a social good sufficiently
outweighs the infringement of these rights); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (proposing an economic theory of neg-
ligence); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) (arguing that wealth maximization is the best
governing principle for law); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possi-
ble End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 607-08
(1992) (noting tension between ethical and economic approaches to tort law
and the ability of the negligence standard to account for both).
24. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2767-68 (stating that doctrines of third-
party copyright liability emerged from the common law); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[V]icarious copyright li-
ability is an 'outgrowth' of respondeat superior."); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The concept of vicarious
copyright liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an outgrowth of the
agency principles of respondeat superior."); Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic
Soc'y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (referring to common law
tort origins of vicarious and contributory copyright liability), modified, 220 F.
Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005).
25. Several other articles also explore insights derived from the connec-
tion between tort and third-party copyright liability. See Ronald J. Mann &
Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 239 (2005); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for
Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amend-
ment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the
Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815 (2005) [hereinafter Yen,
Peer-to-Peer].
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costly. 26 Alternatively, the same area of law might involve strict
liability. If so, liability exists because it encourages defendants
to stop others from infringing and to raise compensation for vic-
tims of infringement.2 7
Reference to tort clarifies the conflicting choices made by
courts before Grokster. Some courts adopted a limited approach
to third-party copyright liability because they were sensitive to
its disadvantages. 28 These courts generally preferred fault-
26. This Article is not the forum for surveying the extensive jurisprudence
of fault or settling theoretical and doctrinal debates about the subject. Never-
theless, it is appropriate to say a few words about the way this Article uses the
term "fault." Common law courts often use fault to identify the culpable behav-
ior that justifies a defendant's legal liability for injuries suffered by another.
Fault exists when the defendant's behavior is unreasonable. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (stating that a person
acts negligently if the person fails to exercise "reasonable care"); id. § 5 (impos-
ing liability for intentional causation of physical harm); id. § 6 (imposing li-
ability for negligent causation of physical harm); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 13 (imposing liability for intentional causation of harmful or offensive
physical contact); id. §§ 283, 284 (describing negligence as a form of unreason-
able behavior); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (2000) ("In the great ma-
jority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the conclusion that the
wrongdoer was at fault in a legally recognizable way."). Of course, a uniform
definition for unreasonable behavior does not exist. However, judgments about
the reasonableness of a defendant's behavior often involve determinations
about the defendant's motivation for acting, the risks and benefits associated
with the defendant's behavior, and social custom. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (stating that intent depends on the
purpose of defendant's action); id. § 3 (noting that the primary factors in de-
termining negligence are foreseeable likelihood of harm, foreseeable severity
of potential harm, and the burden of precaution against harm); id. § 13 (de-
scribing the relevance of custom to the determination of negligence); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (stating that intent depends on the ac-
tor's desire to cause the consequences of her act); id. § 291 ("[An] act is
negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards
as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done."). This
Article's use of fault encompasses all of these possibilities.
27. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (noting that re-
spondeat superior exists to internalize costs and spread loss); Riviello v. Wal-
dron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1280-81 (N.Y. 1979) (noting that respondeat superior
exists out of concern for preventing injury, ensuring compensation, and
spreading loss); see also Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law
of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1267 (1997) (stating that strict
liability is a form of enterprise liability); George L. Priest, The Invention of En-
terprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462-64 (1985) (connecting strict liability to
enterprise liability).
28. The leading case articulating this view is Sony, 464 U.S. 417. See infra
Part L.A and text accompanying notes 185-90 (discussing Sony and other cases
taking a similar view); infra note 60 (listing cases that limit the scope of third-
party copyright liability).
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based constructions of the law because determinations of fault
often include a sophisticated balancing of social costs and bene-
fits. 29 This approach made it possible to protect innocent defen-
dants from bearing responsibility for the misdeeds of others
while limiting liability to situations where the benefits out-
weighed the costs. By contrast, other courts expansively ap-
plied third-party copyright liability because they considered the
prevention of infringement paramount.30 These courts fre-
quently adopted strict liability constructions of the law because
they saw little need to balance the social costs and benefits of
liability. They also expansively interpreted the law to prevent
cynical, faulty defendants from exploiting doctrinal ambiguity
to escape liability, even if this meant exposing innocent defen-
dants to unwarranted liability.3 1
Grokster addressed these conflicting choices in two ways.
First, Justice Souter's opinion of the Court referred repeatedly
to concepts of fault, justifying inducement on the ground that
those who want to cause infringement are culpable. 32 Indeed,
the Court's preference for fault was so strong that the Court
subtly restated the formulation for vicarious liability to exclude
strict liability.33 This established fault as the dominant theory
of third-party copyright liability and cast doubt on strict liabil-
ity interpretations of the law.
Second, Grokster's adoption of inducement greatly reduced
the justification for expansively interpreting pre-Grokster doc-
trines of third-party copyright liability. As noted earlier, ex-
pansive liability ensures that culpable defendants do not escape
liability, but it also risks holding innocent defendants liable for
the behavior of others and suppressing noninfringing behavior.
This Article will show that inducement gives courts a new tool
for holding culpable defendants liable while reducing the risk of
undesirable side effects.34 Future courts should therefore apply
29. See supra note 26 (discussing fault); infra text accompanying notes
185-90 (discussing cases that narrowly interpret third-party copyright liabil-
ity).
30. The leading case articulating this view is Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auc-
tion, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). See infra Part I.B and text accompany-
ing notes 191-202 (discussing Fonovisa and other cases taking a similar view).
31. See infra Part I.B and text accompanying notes 191-202 (discussing
cases that expansively interpret third-party copyright liability).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 218-24 (analyzing Grokster's refer-
ences to fault).
33. See infra text accompanying note 235 (quoting Grokster).
34. See infra Part IV (arguing that Grokster's inducement analysis offers
[91:184
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pre-Grokster doctrines cautiously to minimize those undesir-
able side effects while judiciously using inducement to make
sure that the most culpable defendants face liability.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the doc-
trines that governed third-party copyright liability before Grok-
ster. This description shows that courts generally interpreted
those doctrines with fairly well-articulated limits, and that a
few courts disregarded these limits in order to apply third-
party copyright liability expansively. Part II uses fault and
strict liability to expose the theoretical and practical tradeoffs
implicit in these differing constructions of the law. Next, Part
III analyzes the Grokster case and its use of fault to explain
third-party copyright liability. Part IV describes the implica-
tions of Grokster's reliance on fault and sets forth the general
contours of an improved, post-Grokster construction of third-
party copyright liability. The Article concludes in Part V with
some thoughts about the future of third-party copyright liabil-
ity.
I. THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
BEFORE GROKSTER
Two causes of action derived from tort, contributory copy-
right liability and vicarious copyright liability, governed pre-
Grokster third-party copyright liability. Courts developed these
doctrines along two distinct lines. Most adopted a relatively
limited interpretation of the law, imposing third-party copy-
right liability only on defendants who had close relationships
with primary infringers. A smaller number of courts applied
third-party copyright liability more expansively, imposing li-
ability on a wide range of defendants, including those who had
relatively remote relationships with copyright infringers. This
Part surveys the relevant case law.
A. THE LIMITED INTERPRETATION OF CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
1. Contributory Copyright Liability
Courts routinely cite Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Colum-
bia Artists Management, Inc. for the proposition that "one who,
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
an improved construction of third-party copyright liability).
2006]
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materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,
may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer."3 5 This defini-
tion includes the word "induces," a term which carries great
significance after Grokster. However, the leading elaborations
of contributory liability before Grokster did not analyze the
meaning of inducement. They described instead the type of
knowledge and material contribution required to establish li-
ability.36
The intuition expressed by contributory liability is simple.
If a person knows that another is committing copyright in-
fringement, it is arguably wrong for that person to assist the
infringer. That intuition does not, however, define the level of
knowledge or assistance necessary to create legal liability for
another's infringement, for different types of knowledge and
assistance imply very different results. Consider first a defen-
dant who sells custom-length blank cassette tapes to a person
he knows will use the tapes to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted music for sale to the public.3 7 This seller is quite
35. 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted); see also Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-38 (1984);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); Fono-
visa, 76 F.3d at 262; Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Too,
Inc. v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 138, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Costar
Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696 (D. Md. 2001), aff'd, 373
F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449,
1455-56 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Ez-Tixz, Inc. v. Hit-Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728, 732
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp.
1314, 1320 (D. Mass. 1994); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co.,
542 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D. Neb. 1982); F.E.L. Publ'ns, Ltd. v. Nat'l Conference
of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
36. A few cases base contributory liability on a defendant's encouraging
others to commit infringement. E.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Light-
house Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1292-95 (D. Utah 1999). However,
the vast majority do not analyze contributory liability this way, preferring in-
stead to concentrate on the requirements of knowledge and material contribu-
tion. Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 473 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) ("[Tihe standard for contributory infringement has two prongs-the
'knowledge' prong and the 'material contribution' prong."), modified, 220 F.
Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); Intellectual
Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (stating that knowledge and participation are
touchstones of contributory infringement); Ez-Tixz, 919 F. Supp. at 734 ("Con-
tributory liability requires a showing of (1) actual or constructive knowledge
and (2) participation."); Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 293 ("[B]enefit and con-
trol are the signposts of vicarious liability, [whereas] knowledge and participa-
tion [are] the touchstones of contributory infringement.").
37. These facts are loosely based on Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1453-55.
See infra text accompanying notes 61-73 (summarizing Abdallah).
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culpable because he knows exactly who commits the infringe-
ment, understands the nature of the infringement, and pro-
vides assistance that directly supports the infringement. By
contrast, consider a defendant who processes credit card trans-
actions despite learning that certain unidentified customers
take credit cards in payment for the sale of infringing goods. 38
This defendant is less culpable than the seller of blank tapes
because his knowledge of identity is less specific and his sup-
port is less directly related to infringement. Accordingly, the
scope of contributory copyright liability depends on whether li-
ability requires fairly specific knowledge and direct assistance,
or whether general knowledge and indirect assistance will suf-
fice. Courts differ in their answers to this question, but a ma-
jority of courts require relatively specific knowledge and direct
assistance. 39
This limited approach to contributory liability starts with
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc. 40 The Gershwin defendant was Columbia Artists Manage-
ment, a company that managed concert artists and created op-
portunities for them to perform.41 Columbia sometimes created
performance opportunities by organizing local community per-
formance associations who would in turn sponsor annual con-
cert series for which Columbia could book its performers. 42 Co-
lumbia provided regular assistance to these local associations. 43
It also contacted its artists to get the titles of the works being
performed, and it printed programs for each performance. 44 Un-
fortunately, many of these performances took place without ap-
propriate copyright licenses, and a number of copyright holders
sued Columbia. 45 The district court held Columbia liable on
38. These facts are loosely based on Perfect 10 Inc. v. Visa International
Service Ass'n, No. C 04-00371 JW, 2004 WL 3217732 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2004).
39. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (holding that the defendant's general knowledge
that users of its Betamax videorecorders might commit infringement is not
enough to support a claim of third-party copyright liability); see also infra text
accompanying notes 59-60 (concluding that a defendant cannot generally be
held liable merely because it knows that others will use items sold by the de-
fendant to commit copyright infringement).
40. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 1160.
42. Id. at 1160-61.
43. Id. at 1161.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1160.
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theories of contributory and vicarious liability, and the Second
Circuit affirmed.46
On the whole, Columbia was a rather culpable defendant.
It knew the specific identities of the infringers, the works being
infringed, and the dates on which infringement would hap-
pen.4 7 Moreover, Columbia supported this infringement by or-
ganizing the entities that sponsored infringing concerts and
providing logistical assistance.48 Accordingly, Gershwin is con-
sistent with the proposition that liability exists only when the
defendant has fairly specific knowledge of infringement and of-
fers direct assistance.
The Supreme Court reinforced the limited interpretation of
contributory liability in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 49 In that case, the plaintiffs held copyright in a
number of works that were broadcast for television viewing and
copied by individuals using videotape recorders (VCRs) made
and sold by Sony.50 The claim against Sony was simple. Sony
knew that some of the people who bought VCRs would use
them to commit infringement, and yet Sony assisted them by
selling VCRs. 51 The Ninth Circuit agreed with this argument
and held Sony liable.52
46. Id. at 1162-63.
47. The opinion is not perfectly clear regarding the basis for Columbia's
knowledge that infringing performances were taking place. Columbia stipu-
lated that it made no efforts to obtain licenses for the performances, but that
does not necessarily mean that the artist or the local venue would not obtain
one. Id. at 1161. However, it seems likely that Columbia knew the actual prac-
tices of its artists and venues. Indeed, the court stated that Columbia "knew
that copyrighted works were being performed . . . and that neither the local
association nor the performing artists would secure a copyright license." Id. at
1163.
48. Id. at 1160-61.
49. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
50. Id. at 419-20.
51. Id. at 422-24.
52. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975-
76 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("First, the knowledge element is
clearly satisfied. The corporate appellees 'know' that the Betamax will be used
to reproduce copyrighted materials. In fact, that is the most conspicuous use of
the product. That use is intended, expected, encouraged, and the source of the
product's consumer appeal. The record establishes that appellees knew and
expected that Betamax's major use would be to record copyrighted programs
off-the-air. Second, there is no doubt that appellees have met the other re-
quirements for contributory infringement-inducing, causing, or materially
contributing to the infringing conduct of another. The corporate appellees are
sufficiently engaged in the enterprise to be held accountable.").
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sony did not
have the type of knowledge necessary to support infringe-
ment.53 In so doing, the Court worried that broad third-party
copyright liability would harm the public interest by deterring
productive, legitimate behavior. 54 Copyright therefore had to
"strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate de-
mand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce."55 The Court re-
jected the Ninth Circuit's finding that Sony had actual knowl-
edge of infringement, stating that constructive knowledge of-
fered the only plausible method for supporting Sony's
liability. 56 In theory, Sony's knowledge about its customers' use
of VCRs might have established constructive knowledge, but
the Court held that such knowledge could not exist as long as
VCRs were "capable of substantial noninfringing uses."5 7 The
Court concluded that VCRs were indeed capable of substantial
noninfringing uses and decided the case in Sony's favor. 58
The implications of Sony are significant. Sony clearly knew
("actually knew" in the colloquial sense) that some users of
VCRs would commit infringement. 59 Sony therefore supports
the proposition that a defendant cannot be held liable merely
because it knows that others will use something the defendant
sells to commit copyright infringement. Something more is
needed. The thing being sold must be incapable of substantial
noninfringing use, or the defendant must have more specific
knowledge about infringement, perhaps by knowing the precise
identity of the infringer and the works being infringed.60
53. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony
in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with construc-
tive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law
of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.").
54. Id. at 442.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 53 (quoting Sony).
57. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 ("Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment,
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory in-
fringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable pur-
poses. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.").
58. Id. at 456.
59. See supra note 52 (quoting the Ninth Circuit's Sony opinion).
60. Other courts have endorsed this position. See Matthew Bender & Co.
v. W. Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the defendant not
liable even though so-called "star pagination" in legal case reports might allow
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For example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, the defen-
dant Abdallah sold "time-loaded" cassette tapes. 61 Such tapes
are ordinary blank cassettes that have been loaded with an
amount of tape designed to run for a particular time. 62 Legiti-
mate producers of recorded music use them to reproduce music
programming of nonstandard length.63 To illustrate, if twenty-
six minutes of programming are duplicated on a standard
thirty-minute cassette, listeners would be inconvenienced by
long periods of silence at the end of the tape. 64 A cassette with
precisely twenty-six minutes of tape is far more desirable. 65
Abdallah sold time-loaded cassettes to specific individuals,
knowing they used the tapes to produce counterfeit recordings
of popular music. 66 In some cases, Abdallah timed the length of
legitimate tapes slated for counterfeiting in order to determine
the type of cassette needed. 67 Abdallah claimed that Sony
shielded him from contributory liability because blank time-
loaded cassette tapes are capable of substantial noninfringing
use.68 Abdallah was correct in his characterization of such
others to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding the defendant not liable for selling
software that facilitated copying of computer programs on disks protected by
anti-copying technology, despite the defendant's knowledge that customers
might commit copyright infringement); Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y,
211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding the sponsor of a work
containing infringing copies of photographs not contributorily liable because
the sponsor made a reasonable inquiry about possible infringement and re-
ceived assurances from the primary infringer), modified, 220 F. Supp. 2d 237
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus
Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that a letter
complaining about infringement committed by unidentified exhibitors at com-
puter shows was insufficient to establish summary judgment for the plaintiff
on the issue of the defendant's knowledge); Livnat v. Lavi, No. 96 Civ. 4967
(RWS), 1998 WL 43221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1998) ("[A]ssistance must bear
a direct relationship to the infringing acts, and the contributory infringer must
have acted in concert with the direct infringer."); Demetriades v. Kaufmann,
690 F. Supp. 289, 290-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that a real estate broker
was not contributorily liable for selling land on which a house had been built
with the assistance of infringing architectural plans).
61. 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1456.
64. Id. at 1454.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1454-55.
67. Id. at 1455.
68. Id. at 1456-57.
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tapes, for legitimate producers of music frequently use them. 69
However, the court correctly rejected Abdallah's use of Sony be-
cause he knew exactly to whom he was selling the tapes and
the precise nature of the buyers' behavior. 70 Moreover, Abdal-
lah's assistance went beyond the mere sale of blank tapes. 7 1 He
even financed his customers after a police raid.72 Therefore,
Abdallah's direct assistance, coupled with his specific knowl-
edge of his customers' infringing activities, justified the district
court's imposition of contributory infringement. 73
2. The Limited Interpretation of Vicarious Copyright Liability
Courts have also adopted limited interpretations of vicari-
ous liability. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. pro-
vides the modern definition of the doctrine.7 4 In Shapiro, the
Jalen Amusement Company had made counterfeit recordings of
a number of songs in which the plaintiffs held copyright. 75
Jalen, the concessionaire who operated the record department
in stores owned by the defendant H.L. Green Co., sold the coun-
terfeit recordings in Green's stores. 76 Green's relationship with
its concessionaire was fairly close.77 Jalen had operated Green's
record department for thirteen years, 78 Jalen and its employees
were obligated to follow Green's rules and regulations, and
Green had the authority to discharge Jalen's employees.7 9 Daily
receipts from the sale of records went into Green's cash regis-
ters, and Green's cashiers took custody of the money.8 0 Green
then deducted its ten to twelve percent commission, the sala-
ries of Jalen's employees, and taxes, before giving the balance
to Jalen.8 1 Customers who purchased records from Jalen re-
ceived receipts from Green with no mention of Jalen.8 2 The
69. See id. at 1456.
70. Id. at 1456-58.
71. Id. at 1457.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1456. See supra note 60 for examples of other cases that adopt
the limited approach to contributory liability identified here.
74. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
75. Id. at 306.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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plaintiffs sued Green, contending that it was liable for Jalen's
infringement, but the district court found for Green.83
The Second Circuit reversed.8 4 In so doing, the court un-
derstood that Jalen was not technically Green's employee.8 5
Nevertheless, the court believed that the policies supporting re-
spondeat superior would be well served by holding Green li-
able.8 6 The court wrote:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-
even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly
is being impaired-the purposes of copyright law may be best effectu-
ated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploi-
tation.8 7
In the case at hand, Green had considerable control over
Jalen's behavior through Green's ability to dictate policy and
employment, operate its stores, and control financial receipts. 88
Green's percentage commission also gave it a direct financial
interest in Jalen's infringement.8 9 Accordingly, the court ap-
propriately held Green vicariously liable. 90
Shapiro implied that vicarious copyright liability requires
a fairly high level of control over and an immediately direct fi-
nancial interest in another's infringement. On the issue of con-
trol, Green had a great deal of power over Jalen, particularly
with respect to the conduct of Jalen's employees, their pay-
ment, and the handling of revenue raised from record sales. 91
Such power exceeded the simple ability to influence whether
infringement occurred. It bordered on the active, day-to-day
management of the underlying infringer's business. Similarly,
with respect to financial interest, Green took a percentage of
every infringing record sale. 92 Jalen's infringement led directly
to money in Green's coffers. That is why the Second Circuit
used Green's "obvious and direct financial interest" in Jalen's
infringement to justify liability. 93 The result presumably would
83. Id. at 305.
84. Id. at 307.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 306.
89. See id.
90. Id. at-308-10.
91. Id. at 306.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 307.
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have been different if Green had had only an obscure and indi-
rect financial interest in Jalen's behavior.
Many courts have followed this interpretation of Shapiro.
For example, in Banff Ltd. v Limited, Inc., the Southern Dis-
trict of New York considered the claim that the defendant Lim-
ited, Inc. was liable for infringement committed by its corporate
subsidiary. 94 The court recognized that it could have inter-
preted Shapiro's language to impose liability on the defendant
because a corporate parent legally controls its subsidiaries and
benefits from the subsidiaries' profits. 95 However, the court
feared that this interpretation would hold every parent liable
for the infringing acts of its subsidiaries. 96 Such a result would
improperly expand copyright's reach, so the court interpreted
Shapiro narrowly. The court stated that the formal relationship
between two parties did not control the existence of vicarious
liability. 97 Liability could exist only if the parties' paths
"cross[ed] on a daily basis, and the character of this intersec-
tion must be such that the party against whom liability is
sought is in a position to control the personnel and activities
responsible for the direct infringement."98
Similarly, in Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing (USA),
Inc., the defendant organized a trade show at which it rented
booths to various exhibitors. 99 The plaintiffs alleged that some
of those exhibitors performed some of the plaintiffs' copyrighted
music without licenses.10 0 The plaintiffs sued, claiming that
Reed was vicariously liable for the infringing performances. 101
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court de-
cided in favor of Reed.10 2 The court's rejection of the plaintiffs'
arguments clearly expressed a limited vision of vicarious liabil-
ity. The defendant unquestionably had some ability to control
whether infringement occurred, because it could have prohib-
ited the use of music by exhibitors or monitored such use. The
plaintiffs contended that this ability established a right and
94. 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
95. Id. at 1107.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1109.
98. Id.
99. Nos. 93 CIV. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May
17, 1994).
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *3, 6-7.
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ability to supervise, 103 but the court rejected this argument, cit-
ing Shapiro.104
The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant had a finan-
cial interest in the underlying infringements because music
made the exhibits more attractive, thereby increasing the
show's paid attendance and the defendant's revenue. 105 The
court rejected this interest as insufficient,1 06 a conclusion that
made sense given the obvious distinction between the direct
generation of cash receipts through infringement in Shapiro
and the secondary, indirect economic effects identified by the
Artists Music plaintiffs.1 07
B. THE EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRIBUTORY AND
VICARIOUS COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
The limited interpretation of third-party copyright liability
was a well-established part of pre-Grokster law, for it was con-
sistent with the seminal cases in the field and endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Sony. However, a few courts interpreted the
law differently. Their opinions expanded third-party copyright
liability, making it significantly easier to hold defendants liable
for the misconduct of others.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id. at *5-6.
105. Id. at *6.
106. Id.
107. Other courts take a similar view. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d
1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no vicarious liability against the Internet
service provider America Online (AOL) for allowing its subscribers access to
infringing copies of the plaintiff's work posted by a third party who was not an
AOL subscriber); Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1045 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action
for vicarious copyright liability against a parent corporation for infringement
committed by its wholly owned subsidiary); Burdick v. Koerner, 988 F. Supp.
1206, 1210 (E.D. Wis. 1998) ("[T]he better-reasoned case law demonstrates
that in order to establish vicarious liability in the context of a claim for copy-
right infringement, a plaintiff must introduce evidence beyond a defendant's
membership on a board of directors."); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire
Equip. Distribs. & Nw. Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding no vicarious liability against an Internet service provider for its sub-
scriber's infringing posting of photographs); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (find-
ing no vicarious liability against an Internet service provider for infringing
postings of texts by a third party to an online bulletin board service). It should
be noted that the author served as an expert witness at the district court level
in Ellison on behalf of AOL with respect to issues related to the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act. Those issues are not directly related to this Article.
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Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.'0 is the leading case
that adopts an expansive interpretation of third-party copy-
right liability. The defendants operated the Cherry Auction
swap meet, which rented booth space to vendors for a daily
fee.109 Cherry Auction knew that a number of these vendors
sold counterfeit music tapes. 110 The Fresno County Sheriff
raided Cherry Auction's swap meet in 1991, seizing over thirty-
eight thousand counterfeit recordings and making twenty-
seven arrests.11' In 1992, the Sheriff sent a letter to Cherry
Auction stating that vendors continued to sell counterfeit re-
cordings and that Cherry Auction had agreed to provide the
Sheriff with identifying information about the infringers. 112
The plaintiff's own investigator also observed infringement at
the swap meet by over fifty percent of the vendors. 13 Despite
such knowledge, Cherry Auction continued to operate the swap
meet and rent space to infringers, and it never gathered the in-
formation it had agreed to provide the Sheriff." 4 In fact, the de-
fendants apparently had created two categories of spaces for
rent, reserving one for those who preferred not to provide iden-
tification." 5 This behavior allowed the majority of infringers to
rent in relative anonymity. 1 6 The plaintiffs sued on theories of
contributory and vicarious liability."17
The case against the Fonovisa defendants was question-
able under the limited interpretation of third-party copyright
liability. With respect to contributory liability, the Fonovisa de-
fendants knew less about and did less to help infringement
than the Shapiro or Abdallah defendants did. Those operating
the Cherry Auction only knew that infringement took place at
the swap meet, but they did not know the precise identities of
the miscreants or the works infringed."l 8 Renting booths to in-
108. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
109. Id. at 261.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (noting observation of widespread infringement); see also Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (noting
observation of infringement by "ten of fifteen" and "twelve of seventeen" ven-
dors), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
114. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261.
115. Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at 1494.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The district court opinion and the Ninth Circuit opinion recount that
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fringers facilitated the sale of infringing goods, but the Fono-
visa defendants did not organize infringing entities or print
programs for infringing performances, nor did the Fonovisa de-
fendants measure the time of music being copied or finance in-
fringers. 1 9 With respect to vicarious liability, Cherry Auction
did not control its vendors the way Green controlled Jalen in
Shapiro, nor did Cherry Auction derive revenue from each in-
fringing sale. 120 The district court recognized this and dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint, citing Gershwin and Shapiro
as support.121 The plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit re-
versed.122
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of third-party copyright
liability clearly differed from the limited interpretation that
this Article has already described. The court held that Fonovisa
had alleged sufficient knowledge to support contributory liabil-
ity even though the defendants lacked the specific knowledge
found in Gershwin and Abdallah.123 Additionally, the court
weakened contributory liability's requirement of material con-
tribution by endorsing the idea that simply providing the
means to infringe creates contributory liability.124
Fonovisa did even more to expand vicarious liability. In
Shapiro, the defendant Green had the ability to fire Jalen's
employees, collected Jalen's cash receipts, paid Jalen's taxes,
and issued paychecks on Jalen's behalf. 125 The Fonovisa defen-
dants could do none of these things. Nevertheless, the court
the defendants were aware of infringing sales, but neither opinion states that
the defendants knew the precise identities of the infringers or the works in-
fringed. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261; Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at 1494.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48, 61-73 (describing Gershwin
and Abdallah).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81 (describing the defendant's
relationship with the infringer in Shapiro).
121. Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at 1495-97 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Demetriades v.
Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
122. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 259.
123. Id. at 264; see also Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (2d Cir. 1971) (describing the extent of Colum-
bia's knowledge); A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1454-55
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (describing Abdallah's specific knowledge); supra text accom-
panying notes 40-48, 61-73 (describing Gershwin and Abdallah).
124. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
125. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d
Cir. 1963); supra text accompanying notes 77-81 (discussing the infringer/
third party relationship in Shapiro).
[91:184
GROKSTER
found that the defendants had sufficient control because they
could terminate vendors who committed infringement. 126 With
respect to financial benefit, the Ninth Circuit was equally gen-
erous. Under Shapiro, vicarious liability could not exist unless
the defendant had a direct financial interest in the underlying
infringement. 127 Green had a direct financial interest because it
took a percentage of each infringing sale by Jalen. 128 By con-
trast, the Fonovisa defendants had a much less direct interest
in infringement because they did not share the revenues of in-
fringers who rented swap meet booths.129 This distinction did
not impress the Fonovisa court, for it considered an indirect fi-
nancial benefit alone sufficient to support vicarious liability.130
This interpretation of the law directly contradicted the re-
quirement of direct financial interest found in Shapiro and
many other cases, and it was crucial to the court's decision in
the plaintiffs' favor. 131
Fonovisa is not the only case to apply third-party copyright
liability expansively.132 Indeed, this approach has become suffi-
126. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63.
127. Id. at 263.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Fonovisa's departure from Shapiro was no accident, for the Ninth Cir-
cuit explicitly drew support from Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v.
Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994), a case in which the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts explicitly adopted the notion that an indirect financial
interest could support vicarious liability. Id. at 1326. It is worth pointing out
that this Article is not taking the position that the result of Fonovisa was
wrong. The Fonovisa defendants supported and profited from infringers in a
culpably cynical way that made their liability appropriate. This Article simply
observes that the doctrinal interpretation used to reach this result leads to
broader third-party copyright liability than the interpretation associated with
Sony and the other cases discussed earlier. As will be discussed later, this ex-
pansive interpretation, of the law exposes innocent actors to undue threats of
liability that threaten the public interest. See infra text accompanying notes
191-202 (discussing expansive interpretations of third-party copyright liabil-
ity). This Article further asserts that the Supreme Court addressed this prob-
lem through its adoption in Grokster of a fault-based theory of third-party
copyright liability and the endorsement of intentional inducement as a form of
such liability. See infra Part IV.
132. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th
Cir. 2001) (determining that the defendant's ability to block users from access-
ing its system combined with the role of music in attracting users to its system
establishes likelihood of vicarious liability); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World,
Inc., No. 03-2670 (JBS), 2006 WL 842883, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (grant-
ing summary judgment against flea-market operators for infringement com-
mitted by vendors); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408,
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ciently common to suggest that a remote business relationship
with an infringer is enough to create third-party liability. 133 For
example, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the
plaintiff Perfect 10 held copyrights in a number of pornographic
images distributed via its magazine and website. 134 To Perfect
10's dismay, some competitor websites displayed infringing cop-
ies of Perfect 10 images. 135 Perfect 10 could presumably have
sued each of these websites for copyright infringement, but it
chose instead to sue Cybernet Ventures, a company which ran
an age verification service (AVS) called Adult Check. 136
Adult Check's primary function was to verify the ages of
viewers who wished to see the pornographic images on a num-
ber of independent websites that voluntarily chose to use the
Adult Check service. 137 A new viewer who visited an affiliated
website received the opportunity to purchase a password to a
number of affiliated websites through Cybernet. Cybernet
charged the viewer a fee via credit card and verified the
viewer's age, using the credit card as a proxy for age. 138 Cyber-
net also offered different tiers of password membership, with
viewers who paid higher fees gaining access to "higher-quality"
websites.139 Cybernet reviewed the various websites in its net-
work for the quality of its images, monitored compliance with
its policies, and shared the fees it collected with affiliated web-
sites that referred customers. 140 Perfect 10 moved for a pre-
liminary injunction, that among other things, would have re-
quired Cybernet to enforce Perfect 10's copyright interests
against affiliated websites.14 1
412-14 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (denying the defendants' motion to dismiss a suit al-
leging that the venture capital firm that took control of a company operating a
file-sharing network is liable for vicarious and contributory infringement);
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 994 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(granting summary judgment against flea market operators for infringement
committed by vendors).
133. See Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc., No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617
(D. Utah July 6, 2001) (finding defendant automobile dealerships vicariously
liable for infringement of copyrighted advertising because of the defendants'
ability to reject the advertising).
134. 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1156-57 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
135. Id. at 1162.
136. Id. at 1158.
137. Id. at 1157-58.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1158.
140. Id. at 1158-59, 1173.
141. Id. at 1191-95 (outlining the terms of the preliminary injunction
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The limited approach to third-party copyright liability
casts doubt on Perfect 10's suit against Cybernet. Granted, Cy-
bernet arguably marketed a number of websites and worked to
create a uniform appearance and brand, but those activities do
not necessarily establish the elements of a third-party copy-
right claim. With respect to contributory liability, Cybernet's
knowledge seemed too general, because many of the complaints
it received were "generic."142 Additionally, it is hard to see how
processing membership payments and password systems con-
tributed directly to infringement. These payments may have
provided economic support to infringing websites, but that does
not rise to the level of arranging infringing performances for
one's own clients or providing blank tapes for use by known
counterfeiters. For vicarious liability, it seems difficult to con-
clude that Cybernet could control the underlying infringement,
as each individual website was responsible for its own content
and servers. 143 Moreover, Cybernet's revenue did not come di-
rectly from infringement in the same way that Green's revenue
came from Jalen's. Considering these facts under the usual
standard that preliminary injunctions are issued only when the
plaintiff shows a strong likelihood of success on the merits,1 44
Perfect 10's chances for success would seem slim.
Nevertheless, the Perfect 10 court granted the desired pre-
liminary injunction, relying heavily on Fonovisa to create an
interpretation of third-party copyright liability that comforta-
bly supported its decision. The court began by adopting Fono-
visa's expansive view of contributory liability, concluding that
granted on the plaintiff's behalf).
142. Id. at 1169.
143. Id. at 1158 ("Individual 'webmasters' run the websites that make up
the Adult Check 'network.'... Each webmaster is responsible for running the
website, including creating the site's content, finding a server to host the site
and other technical details .... ).
144. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining
that "a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits" is
among the prerequisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction); see also
Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8th
Cir. 1999) (explaining that "the probability that the moving party will succeed
on the merits" is a factor considered for a preliminary injunction); Miss. Power
& Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Callaway, 489 F.2d at 572); 1lA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995), quoted in Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) ("[A] preliminary injunction is an ex-
traordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the
movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." (footnotes omit-
ted)).
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Cybernet's general level of knowledge was comparable to
Cherry Auction's. 145 Next, the court cited Fonovisa for the
proposition that general support for an infringer's business, as
opposed to direct support of infringement, satisfies the re-
quirement of material contribution. 146 The court made similar
use of Fonovisa to support its findings about vicarious liability.
Remember that Fonovisa found a relatively indirect financial
interest in infringement sufficient to support vicarious liabil-
ity.147 Cybernet therefore could not escape liability simply be-
cause it did not take a share of any profits raised from in-
fringement. 148 To the contrary, Cybernet had the necessary
financial interest because the availability of infringing images
attracted people to websites where they were encouraged to
purchase age verification services. 149 Finally, the court cited
Fonovisa in concluding that Cybernet's ability to terminate in-
fringers from its membership program and control customer ac-
cess through passwords established the control necessary to
support vicarious liability.1 50
Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc. offers yet another example
of the expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liabil-
ity.1 51 The plaintiff Motorvations specialized in designing ad-
vertisements for car dealerships. 152 James Whipple, who was
also in the advertising business, copied Motorvations' prior
work in order to promote a car-sale event for Motorvations' for-
mer client, Larry H. Miller Chrysler/Plymouth (Miller).153 Mo-
torvations sued Whipple for copyright infringement and Miller
for vicarious and contributory infringement. 154 In addition, Mo-
torvations sued Karl Malone Toyota (Malone), who joined the
event that Whipple was promoting, but did not deal directly
145. 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70 ("This evidence of notice compares favora-
bly with the allegations of notice in [Fonovisa].").
146. Id. at 1170-71.
147. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir.
1996); supra text accompanying notes 127-31 (discussing Fonovisa's broad in-
terpretation of financial benefit).
148. 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (expressing strong disagreement with Cyber-
net's contention that it lacked a sufficient financial interest for vicarious liabil-
ity).
149. Id. at 1170-71.
150. Id. at 1171-72.
151. No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 (D. Utah July 6, 2001).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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with Whipple. 155 The court rejected the contributory copyright
claims at summary judgment, but held that Miller and Malone
were vicariously liable.156
The Motorvations approach to vicarious liability is expan-
sive, especially when one keeps in mind the facts of cases like
Shapiro. Neither defendant supervised Whipple to the extent
that Green supervised Jalen, nor did Miller or Malone receive
revenue directly from the infringement. 157 Indeed, Malone had
no direct dealings with Whipple. 15s Nevertheless, the court held
Miller and Malone liable at summary judgment. 159 The court
understood that Miller and Malone had relatively distant rela-
tions with Whipple, but it feared the consequences of failing to
hold them liable. Miller and Malone might be innocent, but
other defendants would take advantage of the law's leniency by
turning a "blind eye" to infringement.160 The court therefore
preferred to hold Miller and Malone liable to ensure liability
against all irresponsible parties. The court accomplished this
objective by holding that Miller and Malone's mere ability to re-
ject the advertising established sufficient control, and that the
defendants had a direct financial interest in creation of
Whipple's advertisement. 16 1
A simple hypothetical demonstrates how cases like Fono-
visa, Perfect 10, and Motorvations greatly expand the scope of
third-party copyright liability.16 2 Imagine an aggressive copy-
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. ("In a business relationship of this sort, it would be all too easy for
a principal to turn a blind eye to tortious and infringing conduct, and neglect
what would otherwise be its duty to prevent the same, with the expectation
that the agent will bear sole responsibility. Furthermore, the relationship's
particular ability to avoid determinative evidence establishing the parties' re-
spective roles facilitates a principal's ability to, after-the-fact, deny its ability
to supervise, especially when it can be held liable if the same is established.").
161. The Motorvations court said practically nothing about its conclusion
that sufficient financial interest existed, but it must have thought that the re-
lationship between the advertisement and the financial success of the car-sale
event was enough to establish a "direct financial interest." See id.
162. Several authors have analyzed the expansive nature of Fonovisa. See
Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An Historical Analysis of
Copyright Liability, 20 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 397 (2002); Barbara
Kolsun & Jonathan Bayer, Indirect Infringement and Counterfeiting: Remedies
Available Against Those Who Knowingly Rent to Counterfeiters, 16 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 383, 407-09 (1998); Kenneth A. Walton, Is a Website Like a
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right holder who wants to hold the electric company responsible
for copyright infringement. His argument is simple. A lot less
infringement would occur if the electric company would stop
selling electricity to infringers because infringers need electric-
ity to access the Internet, burn CDs, or use their computers. To
this end, he discovers the names and addresses of various in-
fringers and sends a complaining letter to the electric company.
He claims that if the electric company does not turn off the
power to the identified infringers, he will sue.
This hypothesized claim is deliberately farfetched. The Su-
preme Court's Sony decision would surely rule out contributory
liability based on constructive knowledge derived from aware-
ness that people use electricity to commit infringement because
electricity is capable of substantial noninfringing uses such as
running refrigerators and illuminating light bulbs.163 To the ex-
tent that the argument for contributory liability might rest on
actual knowledge of specific individuals committing infringe-
ment, the electric company would still not be liable because it is
not substantially involved in infringement. 164 Finally, vicarious
liability would not exist because the electric company does not
dictate who commits infringement, and its financial interest is
remote. 165
However, the expansive interpretation endorsed by Fono-
visa makes the opposite result plausible. The electric company
can control whether infringement occurs by turning off the
power. Additionally, the electric company has at least an indi-
rect interest in the underlying infringement because infringing
behavior increases the demand for electricity. Given Fonovisa's
view that the ability to exclude someone from a swap meet and
the ancillary effect of infringement on concession sales is
Flea Market Stall? How Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction Increases the Risk of
Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability for Online Service Providers, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 921, 942-44 (1997); Yen, Peer-to-Peer, supra
note 25, at 829; Sverker K. Hogberg, Note, The Search for Intent-Based Doc-
trines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 930-
31 (2006).
163. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984) (rejecting liability for a provider of technology as long as the technology
is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses").
164. See supra text accompanying notes 66-73 (discussing Abdallah's di-
rect assistance to infringers and his specific knowledge of infringers' activi-
ties).
165. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing limited interpretations of vicarious
liability).
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enough to establish vicarious liability,166 the electric company's
vicarious liability is no longer farfetched. Fonovisa similarly af-
fects the analysis of the electric company's contributory liabil-
ity. 167 Knowledge arguably exists because our hypothetical
plaintiff sent letters identifying infringers to the electric com-
pany. 168 Moreover, infringers could never commit the infringe-
ment without electricity. Hence the electric company offers the
same kind of support, if not stronger support, to infringers as
did Cherry Auction. 169
166. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-64 (9th
Cir. 1996); supra text accompanying notes 125-31 (describing how Fonovisa
expanded vicarious liability).
167. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264; supra text accompanying notes 123-24
(describing how Fonovisa expanded contributory liability).
168. In fact, the percentage of electric-company customers who commit in-
fringement is probably quite high because electronic equipment that gets used
for infringement has become ubiquitous. For example, every use of a photo-
copying machine raises the possibility of infringement because copyright re-
serves to authors the right to reproduce copyrighted works, and practically
every office and many homes contain photocopying machines. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2000) (listing exclusive rights reserved to copyright owners); id. § 107
(codifying doctrine of fair use, which limits the exclusive rights of copyright
holders under various circumstances); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Docu-
ment Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that a copyshop
committed infringement by making photocopies on behalf of professors for use
as course readings at a university); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60
F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming that the defendant Texaco committed
infringement when its employees made photocopies of journal articles for later
use in scientific research). Videotape recorders are equally common, and are
often used to make and keep copies of television programming on a long-term
basis. Although the Supreme Court has held that making of short-term copies
for purposes of time shifting is fair use, the making of copies for long-term pur-
poses could easily be considered infringement. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55
(affirming the lower court's conclusion that time shifting is fair use). Addition-
ally, the development of digital video recorders like TiVo have compounded the
likelihood of infringement by making recording easier and permitting the
sharing of recordings between devices. See TiVoToGo, http://www.tivo.com
4.9.4.1.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (describing the TiVoToGo service). Fi-
nally, the common ownership of personal computers connected to the Internet
makes the commission of infringement, however inadvertent, quite likely. See
supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (showing many opportunities for
Internet users to commit infringement).
169. Granted, the Fonovisa court may not have wanted to hold the electric
company liable for infringement committed by others. However, the point be-
ing made here is not that the court intended such a result but rather that the
interpretation embraced by the court contained no obvious limit to stop such a
result from occurring. This sets the stage for the expansion of third-party
copyright liability.
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II. TRADEOFFS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
Fonovisa and its progeny meant that the pre-Grokster law
of third-party copyright liability contained two divergent lines
of cases. The first line applied liability relatively narrowly, lim-
iting liability to defendants who are closely involved with in-
fringement committed by others. The second line took a much
broader approach, expanding liability to defendants whose
goods or services support infringement indirectly or occasion-
ally. The inconsistency of pre-Grokster law raises the question
of why courts would interpret the same doctrines so differently.
Answering this question is not easy, and it requires exploration
of the theory and practical consequences of third-party copy-
right liability. This exploration, shows that courts have adopted
different interpretations of third-party copyright liability be-
cause they disagree about tradeoffs implicit in constructing the
law.
Courts agree that third-party copyright liability is a de-
scendant of common law tort,170 and tort law offers two theories
that motivate third-party copyright liability. Such liability
could exist because a defendant's faulty behavior caused some-
one else to infringe. Alternatively, it could exist because, at
least in some situations, defendants are strictly liable for in-
fringement committed by others.
Fault and strict liability explain third-party copyright li-
ability in different ways. Courts use fault to identify defendants
who deserve to be held liable. Fault generally means that the
defendant intended to injure the victim or failed to take rea-
sonable precautions against the possibility of the victim's in-
jury. 171 Faulty defendants deserve to be held liable because
170. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition
that third-party copyright liability arose from common law tort).
171. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 2-3 (describing two general categories of
fault: intentional wrongs and negligent wrongs); see also Conway v. O'Brien,
111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[A person's negligence depends on] the like-
lihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the
injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice
to avoid the risk."), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stat-
ing that a person acts negligently if the person fails to exercise "reasonable
care"); id. § 5 (imposing liability for intentional causation of physical harm);
id. § 6 (imposing liability for negligent causation of physical harm); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (imposing liability for intentional causa-
tion of harmful or offensive physical contact); id. §§ 283, 284 (describing negli-
gence as a form of unreasonable behavior).
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they have done something wrong and are culpably responsible
for the victim's injury.172 This explanation implies that third-
party copyright liability exists to hold defendants responsible
for the consequences of unreasonably supporting infringement.
By contrast, courts impose strict liability in tort with relatively
little regard for whether defendants have behaved unreasona-
bly. Instead, the objective is to make defendants prevent inju-
ries and raise compensation for tort victims. 173 This approach
suggests that third-party copyright liability exists to deter in-
fringement and ensure compensation for any infringement that
occurs.
Strict liability and fault identify important social benefits
associated with third-party copyright liability. It is good for so-
ciety to discourage infringement, raise compensation, and hold
unreasonable actors liable for the consequences of their behav-
ior. However, it is important to recognize the undesirable side
effects that accompany pursuit of these worthy goals.
Consider the potential third-party copyright liability of
Internet service providers (ISPs). ISPs support infringement,
but they also support a great deal of legitimate, noninfringing
behavior such as email, web surfing, and shopping. If society
adopted a blanket rule that ISPs must always pay for in-
fringement committed by their subscribers, ISPs would respond
by stopping some infringement and paying for the rest. Society
would benefit because copyrights would be more secure, but at
least two potentially undesirable consequences would follow.
First, such broad liability would certainly fall on ISPs that
do not deserve liability because their behavior is reasonable. As
an extreme example, an ISP might comprehensively monitor its
subscribers and suspend all who are suspected of infringement.
Such an ISP would stop a great deal of infringement, but
sooner or later a mistake would be made and infringement
would occur. It is unfair to hold such an ISP liable because the
precautions it took against infringement seem more than rea-
sonable. The culpability that might otherwise justify liability
simply does not exist.
172. See DOBBS, supra note 26, at 2 ("[Tlorts are traditionally associated
with wrongdoing in some moral sense."); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and
Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 294-95 (1994) (explaining that
liability in tort exists only when a defendant has done something wrong, par-
ticularly the intentional or negligent acts that constitute faulty behavior).
173. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for
strict liability).
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Second, such broad liability would create social losses by
suppressing valuable noninfringing behavior. Some ISPs may
respond to blanket liability by going out of business, thereby
causing the loss of all the noninfringing behavior the ISP previ-
ously supported. If an ISP chose to stay in business, it would
sometimes mistakenly identify a subscriber's behavior as in-
fringing and deny service to a noninfringer. Even if the ISP
simply chose to pay for its subscribers' infringement, it would
likely do so by levying a fee on all of its subscribers, including
those who do not commit infringement. These noninfringing
subscribers would have to pay more for Internet service, and
subscribers at the margin would ultimately forego the use of
the Internet and its benefits.
This analysis shows that courts must balance the advan-
tages and disadvantages of third-party copyright liability.
Striking this balance requires as much art as science. As an
initial matter, some of the relevant costs and benefits seem in-
commensurable. It may be possible to put a dollar value on
copyright security, but the injustice of imposing liability on a
defendant who has behaved reasonably defies simple monetiza-
tion. Moreover, some of the considerations that are theoreti-
cally quantifiable will prove elusive to measure. There may be a
theoretical dollar value for the noninfringing behavior that is
suppressed as third-party copyright liability expands. However,
the ways in which those losses occur are so diverse that an ac-
curate measurement seems unlikely and certainly beyond the
means of courts. Courts must therefore make sensitive, almost
philosophical, judgments about the social importance of deter-
ring infringement, compensating victims, and holding the cul-
pable liable, and they must do likewise for the social costs of
exposing reasonable, innocent defendants to liability and sup-
pressing legitimate, noninfringing behavior. Only then can they
decide whether the pursuit of admirable objectives justifies the
collateral losses that inevitably follow.
Judges disagree about the interpretation and scope of
third-party copyright liability because they have different opin-
ions on the theory and practical implementation of the law. The
relevant pattern of disagreement emerges by recognizing that
vicarious copyright liability is a form of strict liability, while
contributory liability is a form of fault-based liability that re-
sembles negligence. Vicarious copyright liability is strict be-
cause courts impose it without regard to the reasonableness of
the defendant's behavior. Such liability exists when the defen-
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dant has "the right and ability to supervise" an infringer and
"an obvious and direct financial interest" in the infringe-
ment.174 If vicarious copyright liability were based on fault,
then defendants would be able to escape liability by taking rea-
sonable precautions that excuse them from liability for any in-
fringement that happens to occur. 175 However, the elements of
vicarious liability obviate that possibility because precautions
taken by the defendant do not affect the defendant's control
over or financial interest in any underlying infringement. In
short, vicarious liability exists as long as a defendant has the
necessary relationship with an infringer.1 76
Contributory liability is a form of fault-based liability be-
cause it mimics tort law's inquiry into a defendant's potential
negligence. Standard tort law imposes on defendants the duty
to behave as a reasonable person in the same or similar cir-
cumstances. 177 When courts evaluate whether a defendant is
negligent, they determine what the defendant knew or rea-
sonably should have known about the consequences associated
with his behavior and whether the defendant acted reasonably
174. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963).
175. See Russ v. State, 191 So. 296, 298 (Fla. 1939) ("Negligence is the fail-
ure to observe for the protection of another's interest such care, precaution
and vigilance as the circumstances justly demand .... "); Weinberg v. Dinger,
524 A.2d 366, 374 (N.J. 1987) ("To act non-negligently is to take reasonable
precautions to prevent the occurrence of foreseeable harm to others."); Hart v.
Ivey, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (N.C. 1992) ("Actionable negligence is the failure
to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person would
exercise under similar conditions.").
176. The point being made here can perhaps be seen more easily by consid-
ering the vicarious tort liability of an employer under respondeat superior. For
example, a package delivery service would be held vicariously liable if a deliv-
ery truck operated by a full-time, salaried employee during regular working
hours runs a red light and strikes a pedestrian. Liability exists no matter how
many precautions the delivery service has taken because liability is strict.
Precautions taken by the delivery service do not affect the existence of liabil-
ity. They can only affect the likelihood of an accident. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM ch. 4, scope note, at 276-77 ("A
highly important rule of strict liability is respondeat superior, which renders
employers liable for harms caused by the negligence (and sometimes the in-
tentional torts) of their employees, acting within the scope of employment.").
177. Sanders v. Scarvey, 224 So. 2d 247, 250 (Ala. 1969) ("Negligence
means the failure to exercise reasonable or ordinary care, such care as a rea-
sonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar cir-
cumstances."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 3 (stating that a person acts negligently if the person fails to exercise
"reasonable care"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, 284 (1965) (de-
scribing negligence as a form of unreasonable behavior).
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in light of those consequences.17 8 Contributory liability depends
on the defendant's knowledge of and material contribution to
the infringement of another. 7 9 These elements amount to ask-
ing what a defendant knew or reasonably should have known
about another's infringement and whether the defendant be-
haved reasonably in light of that knowledge.1 8 0 Liability is a
matter of fault because defendants can escape liability by refus-
ing to provide material contribution to known infringers-a
form of behaving reasonably in light of what they know.
The foregoing shows that vicarious and contributory liabil-
ity affect third-party copyright liability very differently. Con-
tributory liability's reliance on fault implies that contributory
liability meaningfully limits the scope of third-party copyright
liability. In tort, fault imposes liability only on culpable defen-
dants who deserve to be held liable because they have inten-
tionally or negligently injured others. Accordingly, the mere
fact that a defendant could have taken precautions against a
plaintiff's injury does not, in and of itself, justify liability.
Something more is required, namely a finding that the defen-
dant's behavior was unreasonable with respect to the plain-
tiff.181 Fault significantly limits third-party copyright liability
because many individuals who might limit or stop infringing
behavior are not unreasonable for having failed to do so. For
example, landlords certainly support infringement because
some of their renters will commit infringement, and landlords
178. Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So. 2d 196, 199 (Miss. 1980) ('The test [for
negligence] is whether the actor being charged with negligence in any circum-
stance acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have acted under the
same or similar circumstances."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284(a)
("Negligent conduct may be ... an act which the actor as a reasonable man
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of
an interest of another ... ").
179. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); supra text accompanying notes 35-36 (discussing
the definition of contributory liability).
180. The connection between contributory copyright liability and negli-
gence is explored further in Yen, Peer-to-Peer, supra note 25, at 855-59.
181. See Rogers v. Retrum, 825 P.2d 20, 23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (finding
that simple exposure to risk is not enough to establish a defendant's negli-
gence); Lane v. City of Buffalo, 250 N.Y.S. 579, 584 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931)
("The test of actionable negligence is not what could have been done to have
prevented a particular accident, but what a reasonably prudent and careful
person would have done under the circumstances in the discharge of his duty
to the injured party. Failure to guard against a remote possibility of accident,
or one which could not, in the exercise of ordinary care, be foreseen, does not
constitute negligence.").
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could take precautions to reduce infringement. However, sim-
ply renting property is not unreasonable behavior. Accordingly,
a court applying fault principles would not ordinarily hold land-
lords liable for infringement committed by tenants. 8 2
By contrast, vicarious liability expands third-party copy-
right liability because vicarious liability is strict. As noted ear-
lier, courts impose strict liability in tort because it deters tor-
tious conduct and raises compensation for victims. 8 3 Strict
liability broadens third-party copyright liability because its ra-
tionale applies to almost any defendant who has influence over
infringement by others. After all, such a defendant could use
her influence to stop or reduce infringement, so liability will
force her to do so or raise money to pay for it. Accordingly, a
court applying strict liability might hold almost any defendant
liable in order to encourage precaution against infringement
and ensure the payment of compensation to copyright hold-
ers. 184
The relationship between the theories and doctrines of
third-party copyright liability makes it possible to identify how
judicial attitudes towards the advantages and disadvantages of
such liability emerge in the theoretical and doctrinal choices
that this Article has described. On one hand, some courts think
that the advantages of third-party copyright liability are mod-
est, especially when compared to the risks of exposing innocent
defendants to liability and suppressing noninfringing behavior.
These courts prefer fault-inspired constructions of the law be-
cause fault is sensitive to the problems associated with third-
party copyright liability. Accordingly, they limit the application
of vicarious liability to a relatively narrow range of facts and
interpret contributory liability with considerable regard for the
defendant's possible innocence and the legitimate noninfringing
activities the defendant supports. Two cases discussed earlier,
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios1 8 5 and Banff
Ltd. v. Limited, Inc.,1 8 6 illustrate this perfectly. In Sony, the
Supreme Court refused to entertain seriously the possibility of
182. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306-08
(2d Cir. 1963); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938).
183. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for
strict liability).
184. See Priest, supra note 27, at 527 (noting that the "unavoidable impli-
cation" of enterprise liability is "absolute liability").
185. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
186. 869 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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vicarious liability,18 7 and it went on to find in Sony's favor pre-
cisely because it worried that the losses associated with third-
party copyright liability outweighed any gains.18 8 In Banff,
Judge Haight understood the "serious implications in greatly
expanding the reach of the Copyright Act,"'1 9 and refused to
hold a parent corporation vicariously liable for the infringe-
ment of its subsidiary. 190
On the other hand, some courts have great confidence in
the benefits of third-party copyright liability and worry very lit-
tle about the associated losses. These courts are comfortable
with the consequences of strict liability, and they gravitate to-
ward the expansive application of vicarious and contributory
liability with relatively little concern for the consequences that
may follow. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.191 vividly ex-
emplifies this reasoning. Remember that the Fonovisa defen-
dants had a good case under a limited interpretation of third-
party copyright liability, and the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint on that basis.192 The Ninth Circuit's rever-
sal therefore required expansive interpretations of both vicari-
ous and contributory liability. 193 A telling combination of theory
and factual circumstance made this possible.
With respect to vicarious liability, the court adopted a clear
strict liability rationale that embraced third-party liability as
valuable without considering the potential negative conse-
quences.19 4 The court approvingly cited Polygram International
Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., a case in which the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts considered a suit for vicarious copyright
liability against the operator of a trade show for the unlicensed
use of music by some of the show's exhibitors. 195 These facts
187. Sony's treatment of vicarious liability is a bit puzzling. The Court uses
the term "vicarious liability." Sony, 464 U.S. at 439. However, the analysis
surrounding use of that term is clearly borrowed from contributory liability
because it concentrates on Sony's knowledge, and knowledge is not an element
of vicarious liability. This blending of vicarious liability into contributory li-
ability suggests the Court's sensitivity to the undesirable side effects of strict
liability and the Court's preference to limit the scope of vicarious liability.
188. Id. at 441-42.
189. 869 F. Supp. at 1107.
190. Id. at 1107-11.
191. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
192. Id. at 262, 264.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 108-31 (describing how Fonovisa
expanded third-party copyright liability).
194. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-64.
195. 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1317-18 (D. Mass. 1994), cited in Fonovisa, 76 F.3d
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were similar to those of Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publishing
(USA), Inc.,196 a case discussed earlier as an example of limited
vicarious liability. The reader will recall that the Artists Music
court did not believe that a trade show operator had enough
control over or financial interest in an exhibitor's infringement
to justify liability. 197 The Polygram court reached exactly the
opposite conclusion, adopting a strict liability theory of the
case:
Modern decisions, when explaining policy justifications for vicarious
liability rather than merely citing precedent, commonly refer to risk
allocation. When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in
which identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily
fair and reasonable to place responsibility for those losses on the per-
son who profits, even if that person makes arrangements for others to
perform the acts that foreseeably cause the losses. The law of vicari-
ous liability treats the expected losses as simply another cost of doing
business. The enterprise and the person profiting from it are better
able than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose act
caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to others who
have profited from the enterprise. In addition, placing responsibility
for the loss on the enterprise has the added benefit of creating a
greater incentive for the enterprise to police its operations carefully to
avoid unnecessary losses.198
This led the court to the consciously broad interpretation of vi-
carious liability that the Fonovisa court later adopted.
With respect to contributory liability, the Fonovisa court
concentrated on facts that made the defendants seem culpably
responsible for assisting infringement. Among other things, the
defendants knew that a number of their renters committed in-
fringement because of the raid conducted by the sheriff and the
complaints received from the plaintiff.19 9 They promised to help
the sheriff identify infringers, but never followed through. 200 In
fact, they appear to have facilitated hiding the infringers' iden-
tity by creating a class of booths that could be rented anony-
at 262.
196. Nos. 93 CIV. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 17, 1994).
197. Interestingly, the Artists Music court used fault to explain its reason-
ing: "The purpose of imposing vicarious liability is to punish one who unfairly
reaps the benefits of another's infringing behavior." Id. at *4. This statement
implies that the Artists Music court was uncomfortable about the prospect of
holding a defendant liable unless the defendant had done something truly
blameworthy.
198. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325.
199. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261.
200. Id.
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mously. 201 These facts show that the defendants were not inno-
cent, accidental supporters of infringement. To the contrary,
they cynically calculated that infringement was good for their
business and took deliberate steps for the purpose of perpetuat-
ing infringement. The defendants wanted infringement to oc-
cur, and they wanted to capitalize on it for business purposes.
In short, leaving aside questions of law, the defendants were
culpable and deserved to be held liable.
The Ninth Circuit must have been outraged by the idea
that such cynically culpable defendants could escape liability
for operating a business that profited so openly from infringe-
ment. The injustice of the district court's decision probably con-
vinced the Ninth Circuit that a great deal of good would come
from holding the defendants liable-enough good to overcome
any undesirable consequences associated with an expansion of
third-party copyright liability's scope. Accordingly, the court
expanded the scope of contributory copyright liability to make
sure that culpable actors would be held responsible for in-
fringement they supported, but it simultaneously opened the
door to overbroad liability that threatens innocent actors while
imposing more social costs than benefits.202
In short, courts failed to give the pre-Grokster law of third-
party copyright liability a coherent structure for two reasons.
First, they could not agree about the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such liability. Second, they had not resolved whether
201. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (E.D.
Cal. 1994), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69 (analyzing the effects of an
expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability). The same thinking
existed' in Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc., No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617
(D. Utah July 6, 2001). The court wrote:
In a business relationship of this sort, it would be all too easy for a
principal to turn a blind eye to tortious and infringing conduct, and
neglect what would otherwise be its duty to prevent the same, with
the expectation that the agent will bear sole responsibility. Further-
more, the relationship's particular ability to avoid determinative evi-
dence establishing the parties' respective roles facilitates a principal's
ability to, after-the-fact, deny its ability to supervise, especially when
it can be held liable if the same is established.
Id. This language shows a court concerned more about stopping infringement
than protecting an innocent defendant from liability. The court knew that it
was interpreting the law to prevent cynical actors from disclaiming responsi-
bility, and the court decided that it was important to stop these cynical actors,
even if the occasional "wrong" result had to be tolerated. See Grossman, supra
note 9, at 359 (arguing that expansion of third-party copyright liability to "get
at the bad guys" created doctrine that can no longer limit the scope of third-
party copyright liability).
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such liability is primarily a matter of fault or strict liability.
Improvement in the law therefore required a framework that
clearly delineates the relative roles of fault and strict liability,
while taking a stance on the relative importance of the advan-
tages and disadvantages associated with third-party copyright
liability. This background explains why Grokster became an
important case. Many anticipated that the Supreme Court
would use Grokster to clarify the law by definitively choosing
one interpretation that clearly identified the parameters of
third-party copyright liability. As will be discussed below, the
Court did not do this as directly as some might have hoped. It
did, however, discuss third-party copyright liability in a man-
ner that promotes a more coherent and effective structure for
the law.
III. GROKSTER
Grokster was the third of three closely followed cases about
the liability of peer-to-peer technology providers. 20 3 In all three
cases, the plaintiffs held copyright in various works that were
traded over peer-to-peer networks created by the defendants,
and the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were vicariously
and contributorily liable for making infringement over those
networks possible. Decisions in the first two of these cases fa-
vored the plaintiffs, 20 4 but the Ninth Circuit granted summary
judgment to the Grokster defendants. 205 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. 20 6
The Supreme Court could have decided Grokster for either
party because each side had support from one branch of pre-
Grokster law. For example, the Court could have applied liabil-
ity expansively under Fonovisa and its progeny. Vicarious li-
ability would have existed because the Grokster defendants had
203. The other cases were In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643
(7th Cir. 2003), and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001).
204. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 656 (rejecting the defendant's appeal
and affirming the district court decision in favor of the plaintiffs); Napster, 239
F.3d at 1024 (agreeing with the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their third-party copyright liabil-
ity claim).
205. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
1163-67 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
206. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2782-83 (2005).
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at least some control over their users' infringement 2 07 and
made peer-to-peer technology available to infringers in the
hope of eventually turning a profit through advertising reve-
nue.208 Contributory liability would have been found because
the defendants created their networks despite knowing that
many people would use the networks for infringement. 20 9
The Court could just as easily have used Sony to deny li-
ability under a limited interpretation of third-party copyright
liability. The Sony Corporation knew that many individuals
committed infringement with VCRs and still sold the technol-
ogy that made infringement possible. 210 However, the Supreme
Court refused to hold Sony liable. 211 As an initial matter, the
generalized knowledge that some individuals used VCRs to
commit infringement did not establish Sony's actual knowledge
of infringement. Sony's liability therefore depended on the im-
putation of constructive knowledge to Sony.2 12 However, the
Court held the imputation of such knowledge inappropriate be-
cause VCRs were capable of "substantial noninfringing uses." 213
Application of this logic would have excused the Grokster de-
fendants from liability. After all, the defendants' networks sup-
ported more than infringing behavior. The district court found
that users traded public domain files as well as copyrighted
files with the permission of copyright holders. Such activity
comprised a distinct minority of network activity, but it was
sufficient for the district court and the Ninth Circuit to charac-
terize the noninfringing uses as "substantial."2 14 The Supreme
207. For example, the defendants could have refused to distribute the soft-
ware or designed safeguards into their networks.
208. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774.
209. Id. at 2772.
210. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423-
24 (1984) (mentioning surveys taken by Sony that showed some users accumu-
lating libraries of tapes recorded from off-air broadcasting).
211. Id.at421.
212. Id. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case,
it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive knowl-
edge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthor-
ized copies of copyrighted material.").
213. Id. at 442 ("[Tlhe sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other arti-
cles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product
is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely
be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."); id. at 456 (concluding that the
Betamax videotape recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses).
214. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
1161-62 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035-37 (C.D. Cal. 2003),
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Court therefore had the chance to establish Sony's control over
cases like Grokster, or to limit Sony's application in favor of
reasoning like Fonovisa's.
Grokster was a tricky case for the Supreme Court because
it embodied the problematic tradeoffs that already plagued the
law. Application of Sony would have had the laudable effect of
protecting innocent defendants from liability and avoiding any
chill on noninfringing behavior. However, it also would have
jeopardized the cases of copyright holders against cynical and
unethical defendants who wanted to exploit Sony's pro-
defendant standard. Almost every technology that supports
copyright infringement can also be used for noninfringing pur-
poses. Unethical and cynical individuals would then claim that
they could support and profit from infringement by citing our
hypothesized Grokster decision for the proposition that a very
small percentage of legitimate use was enough to shield a tech-
nology provider from third-party copyright liability, no matter
what.
The most obvious "solution" to this problem would have
been an interpretation of Sony that allowed courts to more eas-
ily hold defendants liable. Such an intellectual maneuver would
have been similar to the one made by the Fonovisa court, and
the Court could have accomplished it either by holding the de-
fendants vicariously liable or by adopting the plaintiffs' argu-
ment for contributory liability against distributors of technol-
ogy "principally" used for infringement. 215  Such an
interpretation of Sony would indeed have stopped the unethical
and cynical from evading liability. Unfortunately, it would also
have exposed many innocent technology providers to liability
simply because others use their technology to infringe, and it
could easily have discouraged people from creating valuable
technology, thereby harming the public interest.216
The Court chose not to follow either branch of pre-Grokster
law, opting instead to endorse a new, third branch of third-
aff'd, 380 F.3d 1154, vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764.
215. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2778 (2005) (noting the plaintiffs' argument that Sony did not apply to prod-
ucts used principally for infringement).
216. See id. at 2775 (recognizing the possibility of discouraging innovation
through third-party copyright liability); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-
16, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480), available at http://www
.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-480.pdf
(recording various Justices expressing concern about discouraging innovation
if the plaintiffs' position was adopted).
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party copyright liability. This left Sony's sensitivity about the
negative consequences of such liability intact while creating a
new cause of action to protect copyrights. The Court began with
a perceptive and nuanced understanding of contributory liabil-
ity. Before Grokster, the overwhelming majority of cases ana-
lyzed such liability under a single rubric that depended on the
elements of knowledge and material contribution.2 17 Justice
Souter correctly recognized that these elements worked by
measuring the culpable fault of a defendant. 218 Justice Souter's
explicit reference to fault made it possible to explain the logic of
Sony in a way that would protect innocent technology providers
from suit while imposing liability on unethical and cynical dis-
tributors of technology.
The Court began by reviewing Sony's logic and its relation-
ship to patent law's staple article of commerce doctrine. The
Court wrote:
In sum, where an article is "good for nothing else" but infringement,
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability,
and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to in-
fringe. Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of sell-
ing an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and lim-
its liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere
understanding that some of one's products will be misused.219
This passage demonstrates the Court's concern for separat-
ing innocent technology providers whose users happen to com-
mit infringement from those whose behavior is so culpable that
liability is justified. Moreover, the Court clearly did not con-
sider a defendant sufficiently culpable simply for knowing that
its technology could be used to infringe. A "more acute fault"
was required. 22 0 This requirement made the plaintiffs' sug-
gested interpretation of Sony unsatisfactory because it would
impose liability on too many innocent defendants.
It was equally clear, however, that the Court was not going
to allow Sony to shield all distributors of technology simply be-
217. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); supra text accompanying notes 35-36 (discussing
the definition of contributory liability).
218. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777-78 (noting that Sony could not be
"faulted" simply for selling VCRs and that liability is reserved for cases of
"more acute fault" than the simple understanding that a defendant's products
would be misused); id. at 2779 (stating that the Sony rule limited culpable in-
tent).
219. Id. at 2777-78 (citations omitted) (quoting Canada v. Mich. Malleable
Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)).
220. Id. at 2778.
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cause people might use the technology legally. The Court un-
derstood that the culpability of a technology provider depends
on the provider's intent as well as the technology's characteris-
tics. It is one thing to distribute technology that could be used
to infringe in the hope that others will use it legitimately. It is
something else to distribute the same technology in the hope
that others will use it to infringe. The court wrote:
Sony's rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from
the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in
Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evi-
dence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based
liability derived from the common law. Thus, where evidence goes be-
yond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put
to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to pro-
moting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude li-
ability.2 2
1
The Grokster Court's use of fault created two different
ways of analyzing the third-party copyright liability of technol-
ogy providers. The first approach identifies fault from the char-
acteristics and uses of technology distributed by the defendant,
and it is limited by Sony. A defendant who distributes technol-
ogy presumably knows what its technology does and how it
might be used. If the technology is used for infringing purposes,
the defendant's knowledge of such use provides a plausible ba-
sis for labeling the defendant's behavior faulty. However, Sony
limits the imposition of such liability to cases where the defen-
dant's technology is not capable of substantial noninfringing
use because a more permissive regime of liability would expose
too many innocent defendants to liability.222
The second approach identifies fault from evidence of the
defendant's deliberate inducement of infringement and is not
limited by Sony. 223 Someone who advertises use of a particular
technology for infringement or instructs users on how to com-
mit infringement is culpable if infringement results. Moreover,
that culpability does not depend on the characteristics of the
technology in question. The defendant would be equally culpa-
ble if the technology in question has many or very few nonin-
221. Id. at 2779 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
222. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-
42 (1984).
223. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 ("Thus, where evidence goes beyond a
product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing
uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement,
Sony's staple article rule will not preclude liability.").
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fringing uses because the defendant's culpability arises from
his specific desire to cause infringement. Accordingly, Sony
does not affect the third-party copyright liability of defendants
who intentionally induce infringement. 224
The identification of two distinct analyses for third-party
copyright liability profoundly affected the outcome of Grokster.
If liability could be derived only from characteristics of the de-
fendants' technology, the defendants would presumably have
escaped liability because the district court found that the de-
fendants' technology was capable of substantial noninfringing
use. However, the possibility of liability based on the defen-
dants' intentional inducement opened the door to holding the
defendants liable despite those noninfringing uses. The Court
drew particular attention to evidence suggesting that the Grok-
ster defendants wanted their users to infringe. Among other
things, the defendants tried to attract users of other peer-to-
peer file-sharing programs that were widely used to infringe, 225
encouraged users to infringe, 226 and planned to capitalize on in-
fringement they knew would occur. 22 7 The Court went on to
find that the Ninth Circuit had failed to consider evidence of
the defendants' intent to cause infringement, vacated, and re-
manded for further consideration. 228
224. Id. at 2779 ("Evidence of 'active steps . . . taken to encourage direct
infringement,' such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to en-
gage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be used
to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the
law's reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial
product suitable for some lawful use." (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith
Elecs. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988))).
225. Id. at 2772 (referring to the defendants' attempt to recruit those who
used the file-sharing program Napster).
226. Id. ("[E]ach [defendant] clearly voiced the objective that recipients use
[the technology] to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to
encourage infringement.").
227. Id. at 2774. ("[The defendants'] principal object was [to] use ... their
software to download copyrighted works."); id. at 2780-82 (describing purpose-
ful behavior of the defendants).
228. Id. at 2778-79, 2783. The district court recently granted a motion
against defendant StreamCast Networks on the theory suggested by the Su-
preme Court. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No.
CV0108541SVWPJWX, 2006 WL 2806882, at *14-23, 29 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27,
2006) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability
against defendant StreamCast Networks, Inc.). The other Grokster defendants
apparently settled. Id. at *1.
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IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT
LIABILITY AFTER GROKSTER
It may seem on first inspection that Grokster has done
nothing to improve the construction of third-party copyright li-
ability and may have confused things even more. The case left
behind three distinct causes of action for third-party copyright
liability. If courts could not agree about the proper interpreta-
tion of the two doctrines that existed before Grokster, they
should have even more trouble agreeing about vicarious liabil-
ity, contributory liability, and inducement. This reaction to
Grokster is wrong. In reality, Grokster laid the groundwork for
constructive change in the law by emphasizing fault, and not
strict liability, as the primary theory of third-party copyright
liability. This emphasis on fault discredited the expansive ap-
plication of third-party copyright liability found in Fonovisa
and its progeny. It further implied that the limited application
of contributory liability and inducement should become the
backbone of the law, with a smaller role reserved for vicarious
liability.
A. THE PRIMACY OF FAULT AS A THEORY OF THIRD-PARTY
COPYRIGHT LIABILITY
Grokster sent a strong signal that the Supreme Court con-
siders fault the primary theory of third-party copyright liabil-
ity. Note that the Court could have easily reversed the Ninth
Circuit by adopting a strict liability theory of the case. Such a
decision would have been consistent with the imposition of vi-
carious liability, and it would have sent a strong message that
security of copyright mattered more to the Court than a defen-
dant's innocence or the suppression of noninfringing behavior.
Of course, the Court chose not to do this, preferring instead to
explain its decision with a new cause of action based on fault.229
This implied that the Justices were uncomfortable with strict
liability and preferred a fault theory of the case because fault
offered a better framework for balancing the advantages and
disadvantages of third-party copyright liability.
The initial conceptualization of Grokster illustrates the
Court's commitment to fault. The Court recognized that third-
party copyright liability has its costs, and that balancing is cru-
229. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779-80; supra text accompanying notes
218-24 (analyzing Grokster's references to fault).
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cial to proper construction of the law. 230 The Court knew that
the case for liability against the defendants was strong, yet it
eschewed strict liability in favor of fault. In fact, the Court's
commitment to fault was so strong that it changed the ration-
ale of vicarious liability from strict liability to fault. Justice
Souter wrote: "One infringes contributorily by intentionally in-
ducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vi-
cariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining
to exercise a right to stop or limit it."231 At first inspection, this
sentence looks like a routine statement of the basic elements
for third-party copyright liability. The language feels like boi-
lerplate, and the Court cites to the seminal cases defining those
elements, Gershwin and Shapiro.232 However, closer examina-
tion reveals that something more significant is going on. The
reference to Gershwin was generally accurate, and it obviously
foreshadowed the Court's later adoption of inducement. 233
However, the reference to Shapiro introduced an important
change. Shapiro stated that:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-
even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly
is being impaired-the purposes of copyright law may be best effectu-
ated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploi-
tation.234
This is a clear statement of strict liability. A defendant with the
appropriate relationship to an infringer is liable for any in-
fringement that occurs, no matter what. The defendant can ex-
ercise all the control that she has over the infringer in an effort
to stop infringement, but this will not excuse her liability. By
contrast, Grokster's statement of vicarious liability allows the
defendant to escape liability by exercising control. The Court
230. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775 ("The more artistic protection is favored,
the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of
copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off.").
231. Id. at 2776 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)).
232. Id.
233. The Gershwin court stated: "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infring-
ing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." Gershwin Publ'g
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)
(footnote omitted).
234. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963) (citation omitted).
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stated that a defendant "infringes vicariously by profiting from
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or
limit it."235 No longer does a defendant face liability even if she
exercises control. To the contrary, she escapes liability if she
exercises whatever control she has, even if she fails to stop the
infringement. This means that a defendant is not at fault if she
takes reasonable precaution against the possibility of harm to
the plaintiff, a result that is theoretically consistent with the
Court's later assertion that those who induce infringement de-
serve to be held liable.236
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAULT
Grokster's reliance on fault points the way to an improved,
more coherent construction of third-party copyright liability.
Remember that judicial disagreement about fault and strict li-
ability contributed a great deal to the inconsistencies of pre-
Grokster law. Grokster settled this disagreement by clearly
turning away from the strict liability rationale that supported
Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc.237
and Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 238 This preference for
fault created a framework that will govern the future interpre-
tation of vicarious liability, contributory liability, and induce-
ment in copyright.
First, and most importantly, courts should limit vicarious
liability to a relatively narrow range of facts. Expansive appli-
cation of such liability of the sort found in Fonovisa and Mo-
torvations Inc. v. M&M Inc.239 would make perfect sense if
strict liability were the primary rationale governing third-party
copyright liability. However, Grokster made strict liability a
secondary justification for such liability. Future courts should
therefore restrict the application of vicarious copyright liability,
235. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (emphasis added).
236. It is, of course, possible that the Court was simply lax in its formula-
tion of vicarious liability and that no push toward fault was implied. There are
two reasons to discount this possibility. First, the language used is an unmis-
takable change from Shapiro, and its reference to fault matches the important
role played by fault in the rest of the opinion. Second, Justice Souter is a de-
liberate legal writer, a 'lawyer's lawyer" who would not inadvertently depart
from a clear, well-known formulation of doctrine.
237. 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994).
238. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
239. No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 (D. Utah July 6, 2001).
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perhaps to the general contours of respondeat superior, in order
to avoid contradicting Grokster's reliance on fault.240
240. As a normative matter, employers probably should be held strictly li-
able for infringement committed by their employees within the scope of em-
ployment. Respondeat superior offers a sensible model for vicarious copyright
liability because it preserves results that are well accepted as a matter of tort
law while providing sufficiently distinct yet flexible limits on the reach of li-
ability. In general, respondeat superior imposes liability on an employer for
torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957). However, the relationship between em-
ployer and employee is defined in fairly general terms under the law of
agency:
Numerous factual indicia are relevant to whether an agent is an em-
ployee. These include: the extent of control that the agent and the
principal have agreed the principal may exercise over details of the
work; whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation or busi-
ness; whether the type of work done by the agent is customarily done
under a principal's direction or without supervision; the skill required
in the agent's occupation; whether the agent or the principal supplies
the tools and other instrumentalities required for the work and the
place in which to perform it; the length of time during which the
agent is engaged by a principal; whether the agent is paid by the job
or by the time worked; whether the agent's work is part of the princi-
pal's regular business; whether the principal and the agent believe
that they are creating an employment relationship; and whether the
principal is or is not in business. Also relevant is the extent of control
that the principal has exercised in practice over the details of the
agent's work.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2004);
see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)
(listing various factors relevant to determination of whether an em-
ployer/employee relationship exists under the laws of agency in a copyright
case involving the work-made-for-hire doctrine); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (setting forth a list of factors relevant to the existence of an em-
ployer/employee relationship within agency law). The result of this generality
is flexibility that permits courts to extend third-party liability to a reasonably
narrow range of cases beyond the strict confines of a formal, salaried em-
ployer/employee relationship. This flexibility supports the decision reached in
Shapiro, because the defendant store owner Green exercised a great deal of
control over the behavior of its concessionaire Jalen for many years-control
reasonably similar to that exercised by an employer over a formal, salaried
employee. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306
(2d Cir. 1963); supra text accompanying notes 79-91 (describing the control
exercised by Green). Still, this flexibility would not support the result reached
in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal.
2002), or Motorvations, because the defendants in those cases had considera-
bly less control than Green did over Jalen. See supra text accompanying notes
137-40, 143, 150-61 (describing the control exercised by the defendants in
Perfect 10 and Motorvations). For additional discussion of the normative desir-
ability of limiting vicarious liability to the approximate contours of respondeat
superior, see Hogberg, supra note 162, at 939-40.
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Second, courts should cautiously apply contributory liabil-
ity to make sure that the doctrine does not turn into a form of
strict liability. As was noted earlier, courts sometimes interpret
the elements of knowledge and material contribution quite ex-
pansively. This is precisely what happened in Fonovisa and its
progeny. The result may not technically be strict liability, but
the effect is quite similar because innocent defendants face a
real risk of liability.241 If concern about the negative conse-
quences of third-party copyright liability casts doubt on the ex-
pansive interpretation of vicarious liability, it should do like-
wise for the expansive interpretation of contributory liability.
Courts should therefore eschew interpretations drawn from
cases like Fonovisa in favor of those drawn from Sony precisely
because Sony takes careful account of a defendant's potential
innocence and the unintended negative social consequences of
third-party copyright liability.
Third and finally, courts must vigilantly limit the scope of
inducement to keep that doctrine from destroying the rationale
behind fault-based third-party copyright liability. Such vigi-
lance is necessary because plaintiffs will surely urge courts to
apply inducement broadly. After all, Sony does not apply to in-
ducement actions, so courts can hold defendants liable as in-
ducers without explicitly considering the undesirable side ef-
fects of third-party copyright liability. It therefore makes sense
for plaintiffs to sue under inducement whenever possible be-
cause doing so would reach many defendants who would not be
liable under Sony.
The case for expansively applying inducement starts with
the observation that defendants often know that their behavior
will make significant infringement possible. If those defendants
persist in such behavior, even for reasons unrelated to in-
fringement, they should be held liable because they effectively
want the infringement to happen and therefore are culpable. If
accepted, this interpretation of inducement might impose liabil-
ity on manufacturers of CD burners because manufacturers
know that people often use those products to make infringing
copies of music. The same conclusion might also apply to al-
most anyone whose behavior regularly supports infringement
by others.242
241. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69, 191-202 (demonstrating
how Fonovisa expanded third-party copyright liability).
242. This Article is not alone in predicting that litigants will advance
claims like this. See Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Author-
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Careful reflection shows that this interpretation of in-
ducement is superficially attractive, but flawed. As an initial
matter, Justice Souter's opinion carefully circumscribes in-
ducement's reach:
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses
would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor
would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering
customers technical support or product updates, support liability in
themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on pur-
poseful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a
lawful promise. 243
Additionally, a broad cause of action for inducement may
sound in fault, but it is inconsistent with the fault-based
framework created by Grokster. Once again, the common law of
tort provides the crucial insight, for inducement and the law of
intentional tort both require intentional behavior by the defen-
dant. In tort, courts define intent in two ways. A defendant ac-
cused of battery has intent if he acts with the express purpose
of causing harmful or offensive contact on the plaintiff's
body. 24 4 Alternatively, intent exists if the defendant merely
"knows with substantial certainty" that his conduct will cause
such harmful or offensive contact. 245 This dual definition of in-
tent shows that the suggested broad application of inducement
is simply the attempt to apply the second, alternate formula-
tion of intent from tort. The claim is that third-party copyright
isers: A Comparison of the US Supreme Court's Grokster Decision and the Aus-
tralian Federal Court's KaZaa Ruling, 11 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 1, 7 (2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888928 (predicting that inducement will
displace Sony-type inquiries involving substantial noninfringing uses).
243. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2780 (2005).
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13(a) (1965) ("An actor is subject
to liability to another for battery if ... he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person ....").
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("A person acts with the intent to produce a
consequence if ... the person acts knowing that the consequence is substan-
tially certain to result."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A ("The word
'intent' is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the con-
sequences are substantially certain to result from it."). See generally David J.
Jung & David I. Levine, Whence Knowledge Intent? Whither Knowledge In-
tent?, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 551 (1987) (reviewing intent as defined by the
first Restatement of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Kenneth W.
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 471 (1992) (discussing
intent and its role in tort law).
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defendants intentionally induce infringement if they know with
substantial certainty that their behavior will lead to infringe-
ment. After all, a person who knows that his behavior will
surely cause harmful or offensive contact to another "wants"
that contact to happen if he doesn't change his behavior to stop
it. Knowing with substantial certainty therefore makes a de-
fendant culpable in a way that is comparable to a defendant
who acts with the express purpose of causing harmful or offen-
sive contact. Accordingly, third-party copyright defendants are
as culpable as those who truly want infringement to occur sim-
ply because they know that their technologies or services lead
to infringement.
The broad interpretation of inducement fails because it
rests on an insufficiently nuanced understanding of tort law.
The typical "knowing with substantial certainty" case involves
a defendant who has certainty about a single act that exposes
the plaintiff to a single instance of potential harm. In the clas-
sic case of Garratt v. Dailey, the defendant was a boy who
pulled a chair out from under a plaintiff who was in the process
of sitting down.246 The plaintiff, who fell to the ground and suf-
fered injury, sued for battery.247 The trial court accepted the de-
fendant's protestation that he did not want the plaintiff to get
injured and found for the defendant. 248 However, the Supreme
Court of Washington reversed on the ground that the trial
court failed to consider whether the defendant knew with sub-
stantial certainty that the plaintiff would fall to the ground be-
cause the defendant had pulled the chair away.249
By contrast, tort law does not extend liability on the basis
of substantial certainty to defendants whose substantial cer-
tainty comes from the repetitive creation of risk associated with
the widespread manufacture and distribution of products. Con-
sider the sale of automobiles, guns, alcohol, and cigarettes.
Those who make and sell these things know with substantial
certainty that some of their products will eventually injure
someone, yet they are not held liable for those injuries as bat-
246. 279 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Wash. 1955).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1093, 1095; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A
illus. 1 ("A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A knows
that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to injure C, but
knows that his act is substantially certain to do so. C is injured by the explo-
sion. A is subject to liability to C for an intentional tort.").
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terers. Liability, if any, exists under doctrines like negligence
and products liability. 250
The reasons for this are instructive. People have legitimate
reasons for making and selling items like cars, guns, alcohol,
and cigarettes. If battery were to control tort responsibility for
the injuries these products cause, liability would turn on a
blunt determination of whether the defendants knew that peo-
ple would be injured. Manufacturers of widely distributed
products always know that injuries are inevitable, so liability
would seem certain. However, such a result would be absurd
and unfair because the legitimate reasons for making these
items sometimes make the associated risk of injury reasonable.
Doctrines like negligence and products liability consider the
reasonableness of a defendant's behavior in sophisticated ways
that battery does not.25 1 It is therefore a mistake to determine
the liability of manufacturers on the basis of substantial cer-
tainty because doing so would supplant the sophisticated bal-
ancing analyses of negligence or products liability. 252 Courts
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1
cmt. e ("The applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty
that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone
within a small class of potential victims within a localized area."). Other au-
thors have also discussed these issues. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron
D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1138-43 (2001) (noting the need to limit intent
based on substantial certainty); Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Reck-
lessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)'s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1165, 1172-73 (2001).
251. Both negligence and products liability weigh the social value of the
defendant's behavior against any associated risks. Defendants become liable if
these risks are unreasonable when compared against any social value. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) ("A product ... is
defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design ... and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 ("[An] act is negli-
gent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as
the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done."); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (analyzing numer-
ous cases involving design-defect and the risk-benefit tests and suggesting
that the design-defect test in products liability cases is similar to the negli-
gence analysis of reasonableness).
252. See Craig M. Lawson, The Puzzle of Intended Harm in the Tort of Bat-
tery, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 355, 362-65 (2001) (noting that broad readings of intent
would improperly swallow huge areas of negligence or strict products liability
law).
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understand this, and that is why they reject intentional tort li-
ability in such cases.
For example, in Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., the plaintiff sued a cigarette manufacturer for injuries
the plaintiff contended arose from exposure to second-hand
smoke. 253 The plaintiff's complaint included claims for negli-
gence and battery. 254 The defendant responded by moving to
dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims. 255 The court granted the de-
fendant's motion on battery, but it allowed the plaintiff's claim
for negligent failure to warn to proceed. 256
With respect to battery, the plaintiff argued that the
manufacturer knew with substantial certainty that second
hand smoke would eventually contact an unwilling person,
causing injury.257 The logic of this claim is similar to the argu-
ment that a manufacturer of technology induces infringement
because it knows that someone will eventually use the technol-
ogy for infringement. The Shaw court recognized this logic, and
rejected it:
Brown & Williamson did not know with a substantial degree of cer-
tainty that second-hand smoke would touch any particular non-
smoker. While it may have had knowledge that second-hand smoke
would reach some non-smokers, the Court finds that such generalized
knowledge is insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for battery.
Indeed, as defendant points out, a finding that Brown & Williamson
has committed a battery by manufacturing cigarettes would be tan-
tamount to holding manufacturers of handguns liable in battery for
exposing third parties to gunfire. Such a finding would expose the
courts to a flood of farfetched and nebulous litigation concerning the
tort of battery. It is unsurprising that neither plaintiffs nor the Court
have been able to unearth any case where a manufacturer of ciga-
rettes or handguns was found to have committed a battery against
those allegedly injured by its products. 258
253. 973 F. Supp. 539, 541-42 (D. Md. 1997).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 542.
256. Id. at 552.
257. Id. at 548 ("Plaintiffs argue that the intent requirement is satisfied by
Brown & Williamson's intentional manufacture, marketing, and distribution
of Raleigh cigarettes, on the basis that such acts 'set[] in motion the inevitable
series of events leading to plaintiff Robert Shaw's injuries."' (alteration in
original)).
258. Id. It is worth noting that courts in workers' compensation cases
sometimes appear to expand the understanding of intent along the lines sug-
gested by the Shaw plaintiff. The facts of these cases typically involve an em-
ployer whose negligent behavior leads to an employee's injury. The employee
sues the employer, but the employer moves to dismiss on the ground that
workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for the employee's in-
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The foregoing shows why it is important to limit the reach
of inducement. If Grokster's inducement is the conceptual ana-
log of an intentional tort, then traditional doctrines shaped by
Sony are conceptual analogs of negligence and products liabil-
ity. Remember that Sony's assessment of noninfringing uses
essentially asks whether a defendant's conduct is reasonable. If
a technology has sufficient noninfringing uses, then it is rea-
sonable to make and sell it. If those uses are lacking, selling the
technology is unreasonable and liability follows.
Courts need to apply inducement narrowly because broad
application will destroy the nuanced analysis established by
Sony and endorsed in Grokster. Many, if not all, manufacturers
of technology stand in positions similar to those occupied by
manufacturers of socially valuable products because technology
makers know that someone will eventually use their products
to infringe. If courts adopt a broad interpretation of induce-
ment, then substantial certainty about the consequence of in-
fringement will be enough to establish third-party copyright li-
ability, even in cases where the defendants make technology
with substantial noninfringing uses. Such a result would make
no sense because it would destroy our ability to distinguish be-
tween culpable defendants who sell technology with no legiti-
mate uses and innocent defendants who sell technology with
legitimate uses. These defendants can be separated only if the
law is sensitive to the presence of noninfringing uses in cases
where defendants do not want infringement to occur. Courts
must therefore limit the reach of intentional inducement in or-
der to preserve the nuances associated with the Sony rule, just
as they limit the reach of battery to preserve the nuances of
negligence and products liability.259
jury. Employees generally fight these motions for dismissal by claiming that
the employer deliberately or intentionally injured the employee because the
employer knew with substantial certainty that its behavior would cause injury
to an employee. Courts sometimes accept this argument, suggesting that
"knowledge with substantial certainty" makes otherwise negligent conduct in-
tentional. However, these cases are better understood as defining the scope of
workers' compensation and not the general shape of tort law. See Suarez v.
Dickmont Plastics Corp., 639 A.2d 507, 508 (Conn. 1994); Turner v. PCR, Inc.,
754 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 2000), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT.
§ 440.11(1)(b) (2003), as recognized in Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR Inc., 889
So. 2d 779, 781 & n.1, 784 n.5 (Fla. 2004); Sherner v. Conoco, Inc., 995 P.2d
990, 998-99 (Mont. 2000); Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278, 280-81 (Wash.
1995).
259. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2781 n.12 (2005) ("Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a
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Supporters of expansive third-party copyright liability will
understandably balk at the suggestion made here. In their
opinion, cases like Sony are far too lenient on defendants be-
cause they leave behind loopholes to be exploited by cynical
faulty defendants. Expansive interpretations of third-party
copyright liability are therefore necessary, they argue, because
those interpretations make it possible to hold all faulty defen-
dants liable. These supporters acknowledge the exposure of in-
nocent defendants to liability and the suppression of nonin-
fringing behavior as unfortunate, but they argue that these
consequences are less important than guaranteeing the secu-
rity of copyright against cynically faulty behavior. It is there-
fore important for courts to follow the lead of cases like Fono-
visa and interpret contributory liability and inducement as
broadly as possible.
To be sure, the arguments suggested here have some ap-
peal, but Grokster has accounted for them rather well. The ar-
gument in favor of expansive liability operates from a concern
that cynical defendants will deliberately encourage infringe-
ment in hopes of profiting from it. This is exactly what hap-
pened in Fonovisa, where the defendants purposefully helped
infringers hide their identities in order to protect the rental
fees paid by infringers.2 60 There is, however, no longer much
need to interpret third-party copyright liability expansively to
catch these defendants because a properly limited inducement
cause of action can do so with a much smaller risk of unfortu-
nate consequences.
Remember that the touchstone of inducement is the delib-
erate promotion of infringement by others. 261 Inducement will
therefore impose liability on many, if not all, of the cynical de-
fendants whose behavior justifies the expansive interpretation
of third-party copyright liability, and it will accomplish this
court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based
on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device
otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would
tread too close to the Sony safe harbor."); Henderson & Twerski, supra note
250, at 1138-43 (discussing the importance of limiting the reach of intentional
torts based on substantial certainty); Sebok, supra note 250, at 1172-73 (iden-
tifying problems with intent based on substantial certainty and advocating its
elimination).
260. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (E.D.
Cal. 1994), rev'd, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
261. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777-78; supra text accompanying note 221
(quoting Grokster).
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task with relatively few unfortunate side effects. Fonovisa's ex-
pansive interpretation of contributory liability successfully held
cynically faulty defendants liable, but it paved the way for
claims against all kinds of innocent defendants like Internet
service providers, credit card companies, and even the electric
company.262 If the Fonovisa court had applied inducement to its
cynical defendants, it would likely have found them liable be-
cause the defendants behaved in a manner deliberately calcu-
lated to assist infringers. 263 However, the same reasoning
would not have exposed Internet service providers, credit card
companies, or the electric company to liability because none of
them wants infringement to occur. In short, Grokster effectively
eliminated the need for expansive interpretations of contribu-
tory liability by endorsing inducement, a cause of action that
achieves the goals of expansive contributory liability with far
fewer undesirable side effects.264 This answers the concerns of
those who argue for the expansive interpretation of third-party
copyright liability.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69 (analyzing the effects of an
expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 109-16, 202 (describing the Fono-
visa defendants' behavior and the court's perception that the defendants were
cynically culpable).
264. This Article does not claim that every expansive third-party copyright
liability case was correctly decided. Indeed, some of those cases were mistakes
that could have been avoided if courts had used the analytical tools suggested
here. For example, consider the finding of vicarious liability against Malone in
Motorvations Inc. v. M&M Inc., No. 2:99cv0824, 2001 WL 1045617 (D. Utah
July 6, 2001). Recall that Malone was held vicariously liable for infringement
committed by the advertiser Whipple despite never dealing with Whipple at
all. The court justified finding liability against Malone because it was afraid
that other defendants would take advantage of an ambiguity in the law to es-
cape liability. Id. The court's solution was to interpret the law so that Malone
was liable. See supra note 202 (discussing Motorvations). Motorvations is trou-
bling because it holds a defendant vicariously liable for the infringement of
another despite having only a remote business relationship with the infringer.
The court's motivation for doing so is perfectly understandable, but the results
make overbroad liability far too likely. This problem could have been avoided
by using the framework suggested by this Article. Malone would probably
have escaped vicarious liability because it did not have a respondeat superior
relationship with Whipple. Also, Malone would probably have escaped in-
ducement and contributory liability because it neither wanted infringement to
occur nor acted in an unreasonably careless manner. At the same time, the
court would not have had to worry as much about future cynical defendants
escaping liability because those defendants would likely want infringement to
occur. The court could have accordingly used inducement to impose liability on
those defendants.
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C. THE IMPROVED CONSTRUCTION OF THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT
LIABILITY
It is now possible to summarize the improved construction
of third-party copyright liability after Grokster. There are now
three causes of action for such liability: vicarious liability, con-
tributory liability, and inducement. In the vast majority of
cases, the existence of liability depends on a showing that the
defendant is at fault. This means that contributory liability and
inducement will govern most third-party copyright liability
cases, with vicarious liability limited to those cases where
agency principles such as respondeat superior would impose
strict liability on defendants. Additionally, courts should apply
contributory liability and inducement conservatively. In par-
ticular, courts must avoid interpreting contributory liability in
expansive ways that expose innocent defendants to liability and
suppress noninfringing behavior. Instead, courts should make
sure that the law of contributory liability remains sensitive to
the culpability of defendants and the social costs and benefits
associated with their behavior. Finally, inducement should be
found only when the defendant acts for the express purpose of
encouraging infringement. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to
recover when a defendant simply knows with substantial cer-
tainty that his behavior will support infringement. Such a con-
struction of the law is flawed because it would destroy the sen-
sitive balancing that must occur when the defendant does not
deliberately want infringement to occur.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a description of third-party copy-
right liability before Grokster. It showed that pre-Grokster law
had an inconsistent structure that led to significantly divergent
interpretations of the law. This divergence made the law inco-
herent because plaintiffs and defendants alike could never be
sure what line of cases the courts would apply. The Article then
analyzed Grokster and showed that the Supreme Court has
made significant choices that imply a limited construction of
third-party copyright liability. To be sure, some will not agree
about whether the Supreme Court's choices are normatively
desirable, and they will argue for a return to expansive third-
party liability. However, the Article has shown that the limited
approach described here will accomplish many of the objectives
that inspire expansive liability with far fewer negative conse-
quences.
2006] 239
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Of course, it would be foolish to claim that Grokster has
settled all controversies related to third-party copyright liabil-
ity, and no such claim is made here. Even if courts adopt the
construction of third-party copyright liability proposed here,
many unresolved questions will remain. For example, vicarious
liability may have a limited role in third-party copyright liabil-
ity, but the precise contours of its limits are not clear. The doc-
trine's origins in respondeat superior suggest that such liability
could be limited to employers being sued for infringement
committed by their employees. 2 65 Nonetheless, it is conceivable
that courts will identify other limits that would not overwhelm
the fault-based construction of the law. Similarly, contributory
liability may now become the dominant doctrine in third-party
copyright liability, but that doctrine does not identify the kinds
of behavior that future courts will find unreasonable. Individu-
als pursuing legitimate objectives will inevitably expose copy-
right holders to the risk of infringement, and victims of in-
fringement will claim that defendants should have done more
to protect copyright. It remains to be seen whether courts will
give defendants the duty to affirmatively thwart infringement
or whether the honest pursuit of legitimate objectives will be
found reasonable. 266 Finally, courts will surely face unknown
difficulties when they are asked to begin applying the doctrine
of inducement.
All of these challenges are significant, and there will be
others as well. Nevertheless, the intellectual foundations pro-
vided by Grokster represent a distinct improvement over those
available before Grokster. If nothing else, the construction of
third-party copyright liability offered here will give courts a co-
herent framework that encourages courts to approach difficult
issues in a cogent, reasonably consistent way. It is this Article's
hope that decisions made within this framework will, in the
long run, benefit society.
265. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (arguing that vicarious li-
ability should be limited to the contours of rczspondeat superior).
266. See David G. Post et al., "Nice Questions" Unanswered: Grokster,
Sony's Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine, and the Deferred Verdict on Inter-
net File Sharing, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 235, 257-61 (describing questions
left unanswered by Grokster); Christine Pope, Note, Unfinished Business: Are
Today's P2P Networks Liable for Copyright Infringement?, 2005 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 22, 29-36, http://www.law.duke.eduljournals/dltr/articles/PDF/
2005DLTR0022.pdf (surveying post-Grokster ambiguity in the law).
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